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Of Dress and Redress: Student Dress
Restrictions in Constitutional
Law and Culture
Deborah M. Ahrens* & Andrew M. Siegel†
Over the last twenty years, a substantial and increasing percentage of pub-
lic school students have been required to wear school uniforms or adhere to
strict dress codes. They have done so in a cultural and legal landscape that
assumes such restrictions pose few—if any—constitutional problems. As this
Article argues, however, this landscape is relatively new; as recently as forty
years ago, the legal and cultural assumptions about student dress codes were
completely reversed, with the majority of educators and commentators assuming
that our constitutional commitments to equality, autonomy, and free expression
preclude strict student dress restrictions. This Article explores the history of this
evolution as a case study in the messy process through which constitutional law
interacts with politics and culture, at times developing without significant judi-
cial reflection or, indeed, participation. Major cultural developments in parent-
ing, schooling, policing, gender, and race relations interacted with shifting
political dynamics and economic factors to change our frames and alter public
and judicial perception of the scope of underlying constitutional rights. In this
Article, we explain these previously obscured changes in constitutional law and
culture, explore their implications for constitutional theory, and argue for their
reversal. While the underlying constitutional case law is sufficiently indetermi-
nate to support either era’s approach, the approach we reconstruct in this Arti-
cle better serves our children and our constitutional values.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, public school students in the United States enjoyed
broad freedom to dress, groom, and style themselves as they wished. This
emerging norm was, on the one hand, grounded in history; unlike in other
western nations, public school uniforms had never been common in the
United States, and where student dress codes existed, they tended to be poin-
tillist (restricting particular items) rather than totalizing.1 On the other hand,
1 On the history of public school uniforms and dress codes in the United States, see gener-
ally DAVID L. BRUNSMA, THE SCHOOL UNIFORM MOVEMENT AND WHAT IT TELLS US ABOUT
AMERICAN EDUCATION: A SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 1–26 (2004). As discussed below, see infra
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-1\HLC108.txt unknown Seq: 3 13-MAR-19 10:36
2019] Of Dress and Redress 51
these developing expectations of student autonomy were also the product of
changing times, as many school districts across the country had—either vol-
untarily or under threat of litigation—relaxed or abandoned previously ex-
isting grooming and dress restrictions.2 Moreover, the acceptance of student
control over appearance looked to be more than a transitory cultural norm.
While it would be a stretch to say that the constitutional issues were firmly
settled, the few legal decisions that most directly addressed student attire and
grooming pointed in the direction of student freedom,3 and broader develop-
ments in both First Amendment and due process jurisprudence4 suggested
that school districts would have had difficulty justifying restrictions that ap-
peared increasingly arbitrary.5
Fast-forward forty years and the landscape has shifted completely. A
substantial and rapidly growing percentage of American public school stu-
dents are now required to wear school uniforms, and a significantly larger
Part I.A, the literature on student dress restrictions in American public schools before 1960 is
sparse, but the evidence we have suggests that particular schools tended to restrict particular
items or impose specific requirements, often on an ad hoc basis, rather than issuing detailed,
thorough, or formal codes.
2 For further discussion of these developments, see infra Part I.B.
3 See, e.g., Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 163 (E.D. Ark 1972) (holding that school
district must establish “necessity” before imposing broad dress restrictions, and invalidating
numerous dress code provisions for failing to meet that standard); Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F.
Supp. 185, 189 (D.N.H. 1970) (invalidating school rule prohibiting wearing blue jeans);
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D. Conn. 1970) (striking down dress code on vague-
ness and invasion of privacy grounds); Johnson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 60, 95 508 P.2d 547,
549 (Idaho 1973) (invalidating rule prohibiting women from wearing pants); Scott v. Bd. of
Educ., 61 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (same).
The vast majority of court challenges to public school grooming restrictions during this era
involved challenges to hair-length restrictions for male students. These challenges created a
massive split of authority in state and federal courts, dividing the federal courts of appeal
almost exactly down the middle. Compare Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir.
1972) (holding restrictions invalid); Richardson v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir.
1970) (same); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971) (same); Massie v. Henry,
455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (same), with Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 618 (5th Cir.
1972) (en banc) (upholding restrictions); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir.
1971) (same); King v. Saddleback Jr. Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1971) (same);
Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1971) (same). For an excellent albeit early
summary of the cases, see Recent Case, Prohibition of Long Hair Absent Showing of Actual
Disruption Violates Students’ Constitutional Rights, Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Requirement that High School Students Shave is
Valid if Founded on a Rational Basis: Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970), 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702, 1702–04 (1971).
4 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (rec-
ognizing broad free speech rights for public school students); United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (according fairly broad constitutional protection to expressive conduct); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (grounding emerging substantive due process
doctrine in liberty and autonomy rights of individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484–86 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (laying out substantive due process rationale for invali-
dating state actions impinging on important liberty interests).
5 Many commentators during that era confidently predicted the United States Supreme
Court would side with student challengers if dress or hair-length restrictions ever made it onto
the docket. See, e.g., Clifford Lee Reeves, The Personal Appearance of Students—The Abuse
of a Protected Freedom, 20 ALA. L. REV. 104, 113 (1967); Note, High School Hair Regula-
tions, 4 VAL. U. L. REV. 400, 416 (1970).
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percentage are required to adhere to rigid dress codes that drastically limit
their sartorial choices.6 These dress codes are wildly popular, embraced by
strong majorities of parents and educators in geographically and culturally
diverse regions of the country.7 While defenders of dress codes were largely
isolated on the right wing of the political spectrum in the 1960s and 1970s,
their numbers are now buttressed by allies from the left, whose arguments
more commonly reflect concerns about equality than order.8 While dress
codes restricting particular messages, limiting religious expression, or ag-
gressively enforcing gender norms encounter occasional problems in the
courts,9 generalized autonomy- or expression-based challenges to uniforms
or restrictive dress codes are rarely taken seriously by school districts,
judges, or commentators.10
In a relatively short period of time, the overlapping communities of
lawyers, politicians, opinion-makers, and ordinary citizens who comprise
our constitutional culture reconsidered the constitutionality of public school
uniforms and broad student dress codes. The constitutional culture shifted
from a set of background assumptions that understood such policies as anti-
thetical to our collective constitutional values and unlikely to survive consti-
tutional scrutiny to a new set of assumptions that treated such dress policies
6 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY:
2015, 105 (2016) (showing that the percentage of public schools requiring school uniforms
increased from 12% in 1999–2000 to 20% in 2014–15). Furthermore, the percentage of public
schools enforcing a strict dress code increased from 47% in 1999–2000 to 58% in 2013–2014.
See id.
7 See, e.g., David E. Gullatt, Rationales and Strategies for Amending the School Dress
Code to Accommodate Student Uniforms, 27 AM. SECONDARY EDUC. 39, 45 (1999) (finding
that roughly two-thirds of district superintendents felt uniforms would improve discipline);
Todd A. DeMitchell et al., Dress Codes in the Public Schools: Principals, Policies, and
Precepts, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 31, 41 (2000) (finding that principals at all levels strongly favored
dress codes); West et al., Attitudes of Parents About School Uniforms, 2 J. FAM. & CONSUMER
SCI. 91, 92 (1999) (finding that 56% of parents of fourth graders in Lafayette County, Missis-
sippi strongly favored or favored the use of school uniforms in public schools).
8 For a discussion of how the politics of school dress codes flipped, with an emphasis on
the role of the administration of President William Clinton, see infra Part II.E.
9 See, e.g., Castorina v. Madison Cty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 544 (6th Cir. 2001) (con-
cluding that a blanket ban on clothing that displayed the Confederate flag without banning
other political statements was inappropriate); Hayden ex re. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 583 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a hair-length policy for boys but not
for girls constitutes sex discrimination); Ala. & Coushatta Tribes v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep.
Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1336–37 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (enjoining a school district from
enforcing a dress code that prohibited Native Americans from wearing their hair long under
the Free Exercise Clause).
10 An Illinois District Court succinctly states this point: when a student’s “only message is
one of . . . individuality . . . . [this] message is not within the protected scope of the First
Amendment.” Olesen v. Bd. of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 821 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (internal quota-
tions omitted). See also Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 438 (9th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that a content-neutral school uniform policy did not violate plaintiff’s right to free
speech); Canady v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a
school uniform does not prevent students from expressing their views in other ways); Andrew
D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623,
627 (2002) (stating that a school may impose content-neutral limits on free expression such as
school uniforms).
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as constitutionally unproblematic. This fundamental shift in our collective
constitutional understanding did not result from any major intervening
change in Supreme Court case law—the Court issued no opinions dealing
directly with these topics and only a handful of tangentially related ones.11
Nor did it arise from a careful reconsideration of constitutional text or prece-
dent outside the Court—very few lower court cases from this period deal
with these core issues12 and the number of contemporaneous treatises and
law review articles that even address these questions is vanishingly small.13
This historical development raises several fascinating questions. First,
why did it happen? What forces in our culture and politics, what changing
ideas, motivated and sustained our collective reconsideration of the constitu-
tionality of student dress codes? Second, what does this episode tell us about
how our constitutional culture operates and how our constitutional law is
made? Finally, does the current consensus that school uniforms and student
dress codes do not implicate serious concerns about constitutionally pro-
tected autonomy or expression comport with our broader doctrinal struc-
tures, overarching constitutional commitments, and normative instincts?
This Article takes these questions in turn. After Part I fleshes out the
history and case law referenced above, Part II explores developments in po-
11 See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414–15 (1974) (arguably narrowing
category of communicative conduct eligible for constitutional protection); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 276 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007).
12 For a discussion of the few circuit court opinions dealing with core autonomy or expres-
sion based challenges to school uniforms or strict dress codes, see infra Part I.C.
13 For a thorough overview of constitutional issues related to dress, including a chapter on
student dress, see generally RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY (2013). For the
most thorough analysis of the complicated constitutional questions interspersed with provoca-
tive post-structural analysis, see generally Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress, State and
Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L.
REV. 11 (2006). The most prolific scholar on these issues is a non-lawyer, Todd DeMitchell.
See generally DeMitchell et al., supra note 7; Todd A. DeMitchell & Mark A. Paige, School R
Uniforms in the Public Schools: Symbol or Substance? A Law & Policy Analysis, 250 EDUC. L.
REP. 847 (2010); Todd A. DeMitchell, School Uniforms and the Constitution: Common Dress
in an Uncommon Time, 156 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2000). Student scholarship has also addressed
the topic. See generally Alison M. Barbarosh, Note, Undressing the First Amendment in Public
Schools: Do Uniform Dress Codes Violate Students’ First Amendment Rights?, 28 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1415 (1995); Wendy Mahling, Note, Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the Constitu-
tionality of Dress Codes in the Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV. 715 (1996); Dena M. Sarke,
Note, Coed Naked Constitutional Law: The Benefits and Harms of Uniform Dress Require-
ments in American Public Schools, 78 B.U. L. REV. 153 (1998); Alyson Ray, Note, A Nation
of Robots? The Unconstitutionality of Public School Uniform Codes, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
645 (1993). Some of the best recent scholarship focuses on the constitutionality of school dress
codes and uniforms in regards to gender norms, often in light of the experiences of transgender
individuals. See generally Meredith Johnson Harbach, Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, and
Public School Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039 (2016); Deanna J. Glickman, Fashion-
ing Children: Gender Restrictive Dress Codes as an Entry Point for the Trans School to Prison
Pipeline, 24 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 263 (2016); Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Using the
Equal Protection Clause Post-VMI to Keep Gender Stereotypes Out of the Public School Dress
Code Equation, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L & POL’Y 281 (2009); see also Patrick Eoghan Murray,
Constitutional Challenges to Gender-Restrictive School Dress Codes in the Ninth Circuit, 8
MOD. AM. 18 (2013).
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licing, schooling, parenting, politics, and our attitudes towards gender and
sexuality that have facilitated our acceptance—indeed, our embrace—of re-
strictive school dress policies. Part III then explores the mechanisms by
which those trends and attitudes have worked their way into our constitu-
tional analysis, considering along the way broader questions about the pro-
cess through which we make constitutional law and about the relationships
between cultural norms and constitutional doctrine. Finally, Part IV interro-
gates the constitutional analysis implicit (and occasionally explicit) in our
culture’s embrace of broad student dress restrictions and finds that analysis
wanting. As that Part argues, while existing constitutional doctrine does not
require the recognition of broad student dress freedoms, the doctrine com-
fortably permits courts to grant such recognition, and the values underlying
our individual rights provisions strongly counsel in that direction.
Over two or three decades in the late twentieth century, American con-
stitutional culture, with little fanfare, reconsidered the constitutionality of
student dress codes. This reconsideration is rarely mentioned in the legal or
historical literature, and the legal regime it produced has been subjected to,
at best, sporadic critical attention.14 This Article elucidates a prior genera-
tion’s reconsideration of the constitutionality of student dress restrictions,
explores the process through which they changed their minds and the world
they thus created, and ends with the conclusion that we must reconsider that
reconsideration. As it turns out, our modern constitutional complacency
about student dress restrictions rests on a foundation of dubious factual, so-
ciological, and psychological assumptions that allow the courts (and the
broader society) to avoid the inherent tension that exists between these poli-
cies and the normative core of our constitutional order—tensions well recog-
nized in the early 1970s but since forgotten.
14 For notable exceptions, see ROBSON, supra note 13; Hahrbach, supra note 13; and R
Ramachandran, supra note 13; see also Ruthann Robson, Editorial, School Dress Codes: R
Miniskirt Madness, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/05/opinion/
la-oe-robson-dress-codes-school-20130905, archived at https://perma.cc/LBU8-FAMW (draw-
ing on scholarly work to make strong constitutional case against student dress codes). Right
before this Article went to press, Professor Justin Driver published an important book analyz-
ing the general decline in protection for student rights during this era, echoing some of the
themes of this Article without significantly addressing student dress restrictions. See JUSTIN
DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BAT-
TLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND (2018).
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I. PUBLIC SCHOOL DRESS CODES AND SCHOOL UNIFORMS IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN EVOLVING HISTORY
A. The Long View: Limited and Informal Regulation of Dress
as the Initial Norm
Unlike the United Kingdom,15 the United States has a largely unwritten
history of public school dress norms and restrictions.16 As best as scholars
have been able to determine, dress norms and expectations were ubiquitous
in American education up until the late 1960s, but formal dress codes were
surprisingly rare and public school uniforms were almost—perhaps en-
tirely—unheard of.17 Styles and expectations for dress were typically set by
students’ peers and the larger community, turned on material availability,
reinforced gender and class norms, and reflected broader cultural values.18
Anecdotal evidence suggests that school officials resorted to disciplinary ac-
tion to rein in a recalcitrant or non-conforming student, but tended to do so
in a limited and ad hoc way, very rarely establishing a formal dress code.
Despite the persistent use of dress and appearance norms to stifle the cultural
expression of minority groups and to foster assimilation throughout Ameri-
can society,19 little record exists of the kinds of racial, ethnic, and religious
conflict over clothing in public schools that flare up in other nations dealing
with similar questions of assimilation and ethnic identity.20
15 See generally ALEXANDER DAVIDSON, BLAZERS, BADGES, AND BOATERS: A PICTORIAL
HISTORY OF SCHOOL UNIFORM (1990) (documenting nineteenth- and twentieth-century history
of school uniforms in Great Britain); see also Jenny Scott, School Uniforms: A History of
“Rebellion and Conformity,” BBC NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-england-29047752, archived at https://perma.cc/XMF3-V2KG (explaining that the history
of uniforms in British public schools traces back to early 1500s and that uniforms were widely
adopted by British private schools during the nineteenth century).
16 For some sources that briefly discuss this history (without going into much detail or
citing primary sources), see BRUNSMA, supra note 1, at 1–24; DAVID NASAW, SCHOOLED TO R
ORDER: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PUBLIC SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); ROBSON,
supra note 13, at 103–10. American private and parochial schools have a longer history with R
uniforms and strict dress codes, a history that has been more thoroughly chronicled. See gener-
ally SALLY DWYER-MCNULTY, COMMON THREADS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CLOTHING IN
AMERICAN CATHOLICISM (2014); Kerry Weber, Catholic School Uniforms, CATHOLIC DIGEST,
Oct. 2009.
17 See BRUNSMA, supra note 1, at 7–11. But cf. Noonan v. Green, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513, R
514–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (discussing school uniform for girls at California high school that
was voluntarily adopted by vote of student body in 1926 and periodically reenacted through
student referendum, expressing skepticism about its constitutionality, but denying relief for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
18 See BRUNSMA, supra note 1, at 7–11. R
19 See, e.g., BRUNSMA, supra note 1, at 10–11; ROBSON, supra note 13, 104–07; RUTH P. R
RUBINSTEIN, DRESS CODES: MEANINGS AND MESSAGES IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1995);
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 390–93 (1991) (discussing hair style regulation as a form of forced
assimilation).
20 One perverse explanation for the absence of such tension may have been the prevalence
of de jure racial segregation and de facto ethnic, religious, and economic segregation in United
States public schools for vast swaths of our history.
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B. A First Wave of Restrictions and Challenges:
Taking Student Liberties Seriously
During the 1960s and early 1970s, questions about the authority of pub-
lic schools to set and enforce norms for student dress and appearance briefly
became the subject of significant cultural and legal contestation. As students
adopted new clothing styles and grooming habits—chosen in part to inten-
tionally differentiate themselves from older generations and established cul-
tural norms—representatives of those generations and norms pushed back,
adopting increasingly formal and specific guidelines for student dress, hair
length, and facial hair.21 Many students resisted, including some who turned
to litigation.22 While it is tempting to understand this resistance as the stu-
dents’ attempt to throw off longstanding public school (and hence govern-
mental) control over their appearance, such a narrative is largely inconsistent
with both the prior history and the pattern of conflict. As discussed above,
habits of dress in American public schools were traditionally policed
through community and cultural norms rather than through formal govern-
mental policies or enforcement.23 The conflict in the late 1960s emerged
from a fracturing of those norms and reflected contestation for control be-
tween generations and affinity groups rather than resistance to longstanding
state authority. When educators issued edicts telling male students how long
their hair could be24 or forbidding women to wear pants to school,25 they
were mobilizing one of their weapons (authority over formal school disci-
pline) in the service of a larger cultural conflict that was playing out in many
venues and contexts across the nation.26
Within a decade, these battles receded as rapidly as they had emerged,
largely as a result of school acquiescence to student control over their own
21 Many of the court cases involving hair length or dress restrictions specifically note that
the challenged rules had only been adopted in recent years. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460
F.2d 609, 610 n.1 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (explaining that school district adopted general
appearance guidelines in 1960, adopted specific restrictions in 1967, and amended rules three
more times between 1967 and 1970).
22 See, e.g., supra note 3 (listing cases). One scholar reports that between the early to mid- R
1960s and 1974, 150 court cases were filed challenging student grooming or dress restrictions,
versus less than a half dozen filed before then. See Larry D. Bartlett, Hair and Dress Codes
Revisited, 33 EDUC. L. REP. 7, 7–8 (1986).
23 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text (detailing history of cultural norms re- R
garding dress).
24 See generally Recent Case, supra note 3 (detailing first wave of litigation over hair R
length bans).
25 See, e.g., Johnson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 60, 506 P.2d 547, 549 (Idaho 1973) (invalidat-
ing rule prohibiting women from wearing pants); Scott v. Bd. of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (same).
26 Standard works on the social and political conflict of the 1960s include TERRY H. AN-
DERSON, THE MOVEMENT AND THE SIXTIES: PROTEST IN AMERICA FROM GREENSBORO TO
WOUNDED KNEE (1995); WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY (1986); TODD GITLIN,
THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1987); GODFREY HODSON, AMERICA IN OUR
TIME (1976); and MAURICE ISSERMAN, IF I HAD A HAMMER—: THE DEATH OF THE OLD LEFT
AND THE BIRTH OF THE NEW LEFT (1987).
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appearance and dress.27 In large measure, this was cultural and consensual,
as schools across the country voluntarily rescinded regulations over hair
length, blue jeans, and the like, motivated either by an evolving zeitgeist that
increasingly valued student self-determination,28 a wariness over the heavy
costs of enforcement, or a combination of the two.29 These changes were,
however, also the result of the prior decade’s litigation, in which students
challenging public school dress and appearance restrictions won a substan-
tial string of victories under the Federal Constitution or analogous state law
provisions. Student victories included state court decisions in New York and
Idaho striking down prohibitions against women wearing pants,30 a New
Hampshire federal court decision striking down a school’s ban on the wear-
ing of blue jeans,31 Connecticut and Arkansas federal court decisions apply-
ing heightened scrutiny to and striking down many aspects of broader dress
codes,32 and nearly half of the many cases challenging restrictions on male
hair length and hair styles.33 In the one reported case involving a public
school uniform (in this case only for girls), a California court expressed
great skepticism as to whether uniform policies were legal and great confu-
sion as to why a district would feel the need or authority to adopt one, before
ultimately denying relief on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not exhausted
administrative remedies.34
In addition to these concrete victories, the tea leaves from the Supreme
Court appeared to point in favor of recognizing student autonomy over their
dress and appearance. The Court expanded the First Amendment rights of
students in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,35
provided substantial constitutional protection to expressive conduct,36 gradu-
27 In the two decades after the end of the Vietnam War there was almost no litigation over
the school dress codes or appearance restrictions. One scholar counts less than half a dozen
cases of any kind challenging student dress or grooming restriction between 1975 and 1986.
See Bartlett, supra note 22, at 7. Nor was there any substantial news coverage of controversies R
related to such policies.
28 Cf. MARLO THOMAS, FREE TO BE . . . YOU AND ME (Bell Records 1972) (reflecting, in
much quoted lyrics and vignettes, emerging cultural consensus placing individuality, tolerance,
and comfort with one’s own sense of self at top of hierarchy of child-rearing values).
29 One additional factor may have been the existence of federal regulations adopted after
the decisions chronicled in this subpart that denied federal funds to public schools that discrim-
inated on the basis of “appearance.” See Lawrence Feinberg, End of US Regulations on School
Attire Urged, WASH. POST., Apr. 17, 1981, at A26. However, federal enthusiasm for enforcing
these regulations was never high and was non-existent by 1981. See BRUNSMA, supra note 1, at R
14.
30 Johnson, 506 P.2d 547; Scott, 305 N.Y.S.2d 601.
31 Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D.N.H. 1970).
32 See Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp.
114 (D. Conn. 1970).
33 See, e.g., Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding restrictions inva-
lid); Richardson v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (same); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d
1069 (8th Cir. 1971) (same); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972) (same).
34 See Noonan v. Green, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
35 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding First Amendment protected the right of public school
students to wear arm bands protesting the Vietnam War).
36 See e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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ally recognized a substantive due process right to make autonomous deci-
sions about important matters free from state control,37 and even expressed
passing interest in the constitutional issues raised by the hair length cases.38
These Supreme Court actions—in conjunction with the lower court decisions
discussed above and the general tone of the dialogue in legal and news
sources—led many courts of appeals to conclude, in the words of one, that
“our constitutional form of government” protects “the freedom to govern
one’s personal appearance.”39 This right, which “ranks high on the spectrum
of our societal values,” applies in the public schools absent a demonstration
that a limitation was necessary to allow a school “to carry out its educational
mission.”40
At that moment, it appeared that a new constitutional norm was about
to crystalize. Given the absence of school uniforms or formal student dress
codes for most of our history, the string of student victories during the brief
period in which schools tried to assert such formal authority, the wholesale
abandonment of the experiment in dress restriction, a zeitgeist favoring indi-
vidual autonomy and self-expression, and a series of Supreme Court cases
showing sympathy for the constitutionalization of these values, all signs
pointed to the recognition of a broad autonomy- or expression-based right.
While no one doubted that schools retained substantial authority to enforce
discipline and ensure order in the classroom, most courts and commentators
assumed that the standards articulated in Tinker41 struck the appropriate bal-
ance: put succinctly, students would be allowed to dress and groom them-
selves without interference from the state unless the school could
37 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding women have constitutional right
to determine whether to continue or terminate pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (holding individuals have right to access birth control in order to facilitate autonomous
decision about whether to procreate).
38 Most notably in Justice Douglas’s fiery dissent from denial of certiorari in Ferrell v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 856, 856 (1968):
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the States are restrained by an Equal
Protection Clause, a person can be denied education in a public school because of
the length of his hair. I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots might insist
that every male have a crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas of
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ expressed in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, later found specific definition in the Constitution itself, including of course
freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had supposed those guarantees
permitted idiosyncrasies to flourish, especially when they concern the image of one’s
personality and his philosophy toward government and his fellow men.
Municipalities furnish many services to their inhabitants; and I had supposed that it
would be an invidious discrimination to withhold fire protection, police protection,
garbage collection, health protection and the like merely because a person was an
off-beat, non-conformist when it came to hair-do and dress as well as to diet, race,
religion, or his views on Vietnam.
39 Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971).
40 Id.
41 See 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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demonstrate, through evidence rather than conjecture, that a student’s attire
or appearance “substantially disrupted” the educational environment.42
In hindsight, however, it is clear that these ambient assumptions about
the Constitution’s content were never consolidated into concrete constitu-
tional law. The Supreme Court failed to decide a case involving more gen-
eral student dress or appearance restrictions before those cases dried up due
to the disappearance of such restrictions.43 The pronounced circuit split on
the constitutionality of hair length restrictions was never resolved and the
divided reasoning of those cases (and other contemporaneous challenges to
school dress restrictions) became a complicated mass of conflicting, under-
theorized precedent.44 Each of the many cases granting relief to student
plaintiffs relied on a different theory depending on their particular facts and
their particular timing in relation to the Supreme Court’s rapidly evolving
free speech and due process jurisprudence.45 Though some commentators
addressed these cases and attempted to construct a coherent doctrine,46 no
42 Importantly, analysis of this sort was common not only to the vast majority of courts
who granted relief to student petitioners, see, e.g., Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1075 (determining that
under circumstance it was not “necessary to infringe on the students’ right to carry out the
educational mission of the school”); Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D. Ark 1972)
(determining that students possessed broad freedoms “subject [only] to the right of the school
authorities to establish [necessary] regulations”), but also of a substantial portion of those
cases in which relief was ultimately denied, see, e.g., Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wheeler
Cty., 426 F.2d 1154, 1157–58 (5th Cir. 1970) (denying relief in challenge to hair length re-
striction only because, under circumstances, which included evidence of conflict and disrup-
tion, schools met burden of demonstrating that regulation was “reasonable” for “management
of the school”). Commentators not only assumed that such a standard would apply, but also
that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet in the run of the mill case. See, e.g., Eldon
G. Scriven & A. Harrison, Jr., Student Dress Codes, J. SECONDARY EDUC. 291, 291–92 (Nov.
1971) (arguing that student dress restrictions are harmful to youth and difficult and disruptive
to enforce); High School Hair Length Regulations, supra note 5 (same); cf. Reeves, supra note R
5 (arguing pre-Tinker that schools lacked sufficient reasons to justify intrusion on student R
freedoms implicit in grooming restrictions).
43 The Court’s only two comments on the issue were contradictory. Compare Ferrell v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 856, 856 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert)
(arguing in caustic language that such restrictions are obviously unconstitutional), with Karr v.
Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1202–03 (1971) (Black, J., rejecting motion to vacate stay of injunc-
tion pending appeal) (observing in nearly equally caustic language that ruling for student
would “rob[ ] the States of their traditionally recognized power to run their school systems in
accordance with their own best judgment” and noting that “the only thing about [this case]
that borders on the serious” is the supervisory burden the students want to impose on the
overworked federal courts).
44 For attempts to make sense of the full landscape of these cases, with particular attention
to their similarities, differences, and contradictions, see Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th
Cir. 1972) (en banc); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Recent Case, supra note
3. R
45 Compare, e.g., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1970) (relying on the Due
Process Clause), with Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 856, 856 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of cert) (relying on the Equal Protection Clause), and Breen v. Kahl,
419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969) (relying on the Ninth Amendment and “penumbras” of the First
Amendment).
46 See, e.g., Recent Case, supra note 3. R
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definitive treatise or law review article provided order to the chaos by articu-
lating a comprehensive theory.
C. The Modern School Uniform and Dress Code Movement:
More Restrictions, Fewer Rights
As described elsewhere in this Article, a variety of politicians, educa-
tors, and social commentators redirected public attention to issues of student
dress and appearance during the late 1980s and early 1990s.47 Initially, these
actors proceeded in a constitutional vacuum, either unaware of or uncon-
cerned about the substantial constitutional constraints implied by the ex-
isting case law. In contrast, the Clinton administration officials who
championed and popularized uniform policies and strict dress codes begin-
ning in 1996,48 at least paid significant lip service to the Constitution, issuing
“guidelines” warning schools to leave space for religious and overtly politi-
cal expression, to offer sound policy rationales for dress restrictions, and to
avoid using vague and overbroad language.49 In addition, the guidelines re-
minded schools of their due process obligations before suspending or expel-
ling students for dress code or other violations, advocated community
engagement in the planning of dress policies, and encouraged consideration
of—though not necessarily adoption of—opt-out provisions.50
The Clinton administration’s parsing of these issues was both a crucial
step in the reconsideration of the constitutionality of student dress restric-
tions and a classic example of the tendency of modern bureaucracies to treat
constitutional objections as design problems that need to be managed and
massaged rather than as conflicts of values that need to be resolved.51 The
47 See generally infra Part II.
48 See infra Part II.E; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., MANUAL ON SCHOOL UNIFORMS (1996), avail-
able at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED387947.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/MD6J-
74CQ [hereinafter “MANUAL”].
49 See MANUAL, supra note 48, at 2. R
50 See id. at 1–3.
51 See id. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1323–25 (2006) (discussing how rules for implementing
constitutional meaning inevitably lead to under-enforcement by bureaucracies justifiably wor-
ried about over-enforcement); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Demo-
cratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (chronicling and advocating for
embrace of new mechanisms of constitutional decision-making that allow for experimentation
around implementation of rights even if the creation of such democratic space at times results
in the protection of fewer or narrower rights); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (explaining and critiquing the dominant role
balancing tests have come to play in constitutional law and degree to which they blind us to
fact that value choices are at heart of constitutional decision-making). Jamal Greene recently
offered a provocative case for an approach to constitutional rights that is focused more ex-
pressly on balancing individual freedoms and collective policy goals. See Jamal Greene, Fore-
word: Rights as Trumps, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018). Among many other virtues, his
analysis reminds us that students challenging dress restrictions might in the end receive more
protection in a vital system premised on balancing than in our current system that treats rights
as trumps but then, of necessity, sharply limits the universe of recognized rights.
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guidelines instructed school officials on how to avoid real but ancillary con-
stitutional objections,52 how to develop a record most likely to withstand
legal challenge,53 and how to build the kind of popular support that would
decrease the likelihood of legal challenge and raise the political and institu-
tional cost for courts inclined to strike down governmental action.54
With regard to the more central constitutional objection—that condi-
tioning receipt of a crucial public good on adherence to governmental dress
and grooming standards violates basic principles of autonomy and self-ex-
pression—the guidelines adopted several avoidance strategies. First, they
purported to protect expressive rights by insisting on freedom to wear relig-
ious garb and political buttons while defining out of the realm of expression
most of the decisions school-aged children make about their appearance and
dress,55 notwithstanding the careful communications implicit in those
choices.56 Second, they built layers of ambiguity into their analysis of the
ultimate question of whether public schools could shut their doors to stu-
dents unwilling to let the state dictate their appearance, by (1) encouraging
schools to consider optional uniforms in addition to mandatory ones; (2)
encouraging them to consider “opt-out provisions” if they did adopt
mandatory uniforms; (3) encouraging them to build a record of the need for
drastic measures if they chose mandatory uniforms without an opt-out provi-
sion; and (4) noting that in the absence of such a record, such a program
“might be vulnerable to legal challenge.”57
In the two decades since the Clinton administration encouraged Ameri-
can public schools to experiment with school uniforms and strict dress
codes, such restrictions have become a common—though not quite omni-
present—feature of American public education. The best estimates suggest
that approximately a quarter of American public school students now go to
schools with uniform policies and another 50–60% attend schools with strict
dress codes.58 These dress restrictive policies have faced a substantial,
though not enormous, number of legal challenges. Many of those challenges
have involved the kind of peripheral issues the Clinton administration identi-
fied; much as they predicted, the courts have, on occasion, struck down dress
restrictions that did not provide space for religious expression,59 prohibited
52 See MANUAL, supra note 48, at 2. R
53 See id. at 3.
54 See id. at 1.
55 See id. at 2.
56 See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text (discussing communicative content of R
young adult fashion decisions).
57
MANUAL, supra note 48, at 2. R
58 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND
SAFETY: 2015, at 105 (2016) (determining that in 2013-2014 approximately twenty percent of
public schools required school uniforms and another fifty-eight percent imposed “strict” dress
codes that drastically limit what students can wear).
59 See, e.g., A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 2d 863
(S.D. Tex. 2009) (invalidating plaintiff dress and appearance restrictions prohibiting him from
wearing his hair in style meant to convey connection to traditional Native American religious
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or required the wearing of particular messages,60 were excessively vague,61
or arbitrarily reinforced inequitable gender norms.62 Fewer cases have raised
broad liberty-, autonomy-, or expression-based challenges to student dress
restrictions.63 When such cases have been brought, they have run into a wall
of judicial skepticism and have been rejected nearly uniformly, often without
thorough consideration.64 As a result, we find ourselves in almost entirely
the opposite position from where we were in 1975: our case law and legal
zeitgeist assume that broad student dress restrictions are wholly constitu-
tional, but those norms and assumptions are neither cemented by a definitive
Supreme Court ruling nor sufficiently theorized.
Less than a dozen reported court cases over the last quarter-century deal
directly with broad expression- or autonomy-based objections to student
dress codes or school uniforms, and students have yet to win a significant
victory.65 Many of the cases are under-theorized and each applies a slightly
practice); Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (strik-
ing down provisions of school dress code that prohibited wearing of rosaries).
60 See, e.g., Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down mandatory
school uniform policy that required students to wear clothing displaying school slogan);
Sypeniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. Of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2003) (enjoining
school district from punishing student under harassment provisions of school dress code for
wearing t-shirt quoting Jeff Foxworthy comedy routine “You Might Be a Redneck If. . .”);
Castornia v. Madison Cty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of summary
judgment for school that disciplined students for wearing clothing containing Confederate flag
imagery and remanding for further proceedings on whether record established need for such a
ban and on whether selective enforcement had occurred). But see, e.g., Palmer ex rel. Palmer
v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting challenge to school
district policy barring shirts with words on them brought by student who wanted to make
express political statement even after concession by district that the words were not lewd,
inappropriate, or disruptive).
61 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997)
(striking down as void for vagueness a school district regulation barring “gang symbols” on
clothing and tattoos without providing definitions or guidance); Melerine v. Jefferson Parrish
Sch. Bd., 210 So. 3d 929 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing grant of summary judgment to school
district in case challenging dress code for school prom, finding genuine issue of material fact
exists as to arbitrary enforcement); cf. Pyle ex rel. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F.
Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994) (enjoining provision of dress code prohibiting clothing items that
“harass” others on grounds that such a general prohibition cannot be enforced consistent with
First Amendment).
62 See, e.g., Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greenburg Comm. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569 (7th Cir.
2014) (granting injunction against school rule prohibiting boys from playing basketball with
long hair but not regulating grooming choices of female players); Peltier v. Charter Day Sch.,
Inc., No. 7:16-CV-30-H, 2017 WL 1194460 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017) (denying motion to
dismiss equal protection challenge to rule prohibiting girls from wearing shorts or pants but
allowing boys to do so).
63 For the major exceptions, see cases cited infra note 60. R
64 See cases cited infra note 60 and cases discussed infra notes 60–115. R
65 The most thoroughly litigated, cited, or discussed challenges include Bar-Navon v. Bre-
vard Cty. Sch. Bd., 290 Fed. App’x. 273 (11th Cir. 2008); Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526
F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005);
Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001); Canady v. Bossier Par.
Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001); Long v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty., 121 F. Supp.
2d 621 (W.D. Ky. 2000); Dempsey v. Alston, 966 A.2d 1 (N.J. App. Div. 2009); Phoenix
Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Green, 943 P.2d 836 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Byars v. City of Water-
bury, 795 A.2d 630 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001).
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different analysis, but a few key themes run through the cases. First, courts
are largely—though not uniformly—unwilling to acknowledge that student
dress has any significant expressive component,66 often noting that neither
the courts nor the student plaintiffs can identify the students’ message with
any degree of precision67 and treating with skepticism the more particular-
ized messages offered in the course of litigation by more sophisticated or
tactical plaintiffs.68 Second, even those courts willing to entertain free ex-
pression claims are reluctant to seriously interrogate schools’ proffered justi-
fications for their dress policies. These courts treat such policies as content-
neutral decorum rules requiring little justification,69 deem the state’s pro-
posed justifications as self-evidently weighty,70 or expressly defer to school
officials on questions of order, discipline, and pedagogy.71 Third, almost
every court to address substantive due process or other liberty- and auton-
omy-based challenges has treated the proposed challenge as a broader liber-
tarian assault on the state’s ability to regulate in the realms of education and
child-rearing, rather than a targeted claim about a particular liberty interest,
and dismissed it after cursory analysis.72
These thematically similar cases align along a spectrum, well-illustrated
by the contrasting jurisprudence of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. Many re-
cent cases take their cue from an oft-cited Sixth Circuit opinion by Judge
Sutton, which goes out of its way to trivialize and even mock the constitu-
66 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 388–90; Bar-Navon, 290 Fed. App’x. at 273 (arguing rule
against piercings does not even “implicate” First Amendment and reaffirming circuit prece-
dent that high school “grooming” restrictions are “per se valid”); Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. of
City of Chicago, 480 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that students enjoy no pro-
tected speech right to wear T-shirt of their own design because “clothing as such is not—not
normally at any rate—constitutionally protected expression”).
67 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 388–90; Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 283–86; Long, 121 F. Supp.
2d at 624 (“Plaintiffs do not seek to express a particular message either directly or indirectly.
They merely want the right to wear clothes of their own choosing.”).
68 See, e.g., Bar-Navon, 290 Fed. App’x. at 273 (rejecting on its face well-articulated claim
that wearing of non-traditional jewelry articulates an intentional and broadly understood claim
of “individuality”); Dempsey, 966 A.2d 1 at 10 (rejecting student’s assertion that he was at-
tempting to articulate message “I have rights”).
69 See, e.g., Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 432 (emphasizing safety and behavioral aspects of rule in
explaining why it is content-neutral); see also Palmer, 579 F.3d at 507–08 (treating strict dress
code barring any clothing with words as “content neutral” rule designed to maintain order and
enrich learning environment).
70 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 391–93 (listing policy arguments advocates use to support
student dress restrictions and treating them as largely self-evident); Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 286
(“[I]mproving the educational process is undoubtedly an important and substantial interest of
Forney and the school board.”); accord Canady, 240 F.3d at 443.
71 See, e.g., Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 287 (“As has been well recognized, federal courts
should defer to school boards to decide, within constitutional bounds, what constitutes appro-
priate behavior and dress in public schools.”); accord Canady, 240 F.3d at 443–44.
72 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 393–96 (rejecting parent’s substantive due process claim as
anarchic and student’s because encroachments on liberty were trivial in comparison with most
fundamental rights cases); Long, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 627–28 (concluding based on precedent
that there is no fundamental right to make clothing choices and stopping analysis at that point);
Byars, 795 A.2d at 641–43 (holding that dress and grooming restrictions that do not implicate
bodily integrity are standard-order school rules that implicate no serious liberty concerns).
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tional challenges raised by the plaintiffs.73 In that case, Blau v. Fort Thomas
Public School District,74 a Kentucky middle school adopted a strict dress
code that effectively limited students to several colors of solid tops in a
handful of styles and imposed substantial restrictions on other clothes, shoes,
and hairstyles.75 A female student—who had unsuccessfully fought the
adoption of the dress code—and her father sued, alleging violations of her
First Amendment right to freedom of expression, her substantive due process
right to make autonomous choices about her clothing, and his substantive
due process right to control the upbringing of his child.76
After reciting the facts, the court turns to the student’s First Amendment
claim, immediately adopting a tone that is pithy and brazenly unsympathetic.
The court begins its analysis by stating that “the difficult question is not one
of outcome” but “whether the First Amendment covers this kind of claim at
all.”77 In parsing cases from the Sixth Circuit on student dress, the court then
argues ipse dixit that narrow decisions upholding rules prohibiting students
from wearing particularly violent and offensive images “surely” meant that
schools could impose a broad ban on “the types of pants and tops students
may wear,” without acknowledging that broader bans would limit substan-
tially more expression and do so without the kind of particularized justifica-
tions provided in earlier cases.78 Similarly, in analyzing the Supreme Court’s
cases on “expressive-conduct,” the court accurately quotes a series of tan-
gled and occasionally contradictory Supreme Court precedents that, with one
hand, offer broad protection to conduct that is intended to be communicative
irrespective of the message’s clarity and, with the other hand, claw back a
substantial portion of that protection when the expression is not sufficiently
particularized.79 But then the opinion does nothing to untie the knot, relying
on conclusory statements and rhetorical attacks to reject Blau’s claims.80
At its heart, the court’s First Amendment analysis is premised on a trivi-
alization—indeed a mischaracterization—of the expressive communication
for which Blau sought protection. The opinion is quick to attack Blau for
burdening the federal courts with litigation to vindicate a right to wear
clothes that “look nice,”81 that she “feels good in,”82 or that express her
73 See Blau, 401 F.3d 381. For significant discussions of Blau by other courts, see, e.g.,
Bar–Navon v. Brevard Cty. Sch. Bd., 290 Fed.Appx. 273, 276–77 (11th Cir. 2008); Lowry v.
Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (E.D. Ark. 2007); Dempsey v. Alston,
966 A.2d 1, 10–11 (N.J. App. Div. 2009).
74 401 F.3d 381.
75 See id. at 385–87.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 388.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 388–90.
80 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 388 (Supreme Court cases “offer poor analogies”); id. at
389 (her argument “gives the invocation of precedent a bad name”); id. at 390 (to rule for
plaintiff would “risk deprecating the First Amendment”).
81 Id. at 389.
82 Id. at 388.
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“sense of individuality.”83 But those formulations are either bland explana-
tions of how an individual chooses his or her clothing on a daily basis or
generalized explanations of why expressive rights are implicated in clothing
choices, not an accurate parsing of the messages Blau would have been con-
veying on a daily basis if the regulations had been struck down. Blau might
have offered a series of experts on fashion and teen culture to provide testi-
mony on the dense semiotics of particular styles, colors, and garments in the
adolescent world (and it might behoove future litigants to do so); however,
the Supreme Court precedents cited by the Sixth Circuit do not require ex-
pressive painters or writers of nonsense verse to make such expert showings
in order to enjoy First Amendment protection.84 One could plausibly argue
that the school context,85 the nature of the speech, or the countervailing justi-
fications offered by the state86 ultimately distinguish those examples. But
such analysis ought to begin both with an accurate characterization of the
reasons why a teenager seeks expressive freedom in the realm of dress and a
recognition of the centrality of appearance in the creation and projection of
self in adolescent communities.
The Blau court is even more dismissive and trivializing toward the
plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims.87 With regard to the father’s claim,
the court presents public schooling as an either/or choice and suggests that
parents have no constitutional right to object to particular public school poli-
cies that interfere with their childrearing beliefs.88 This is a plausible, if
blunt, reading of the limited existing precedent,89 albeit one that perhaps pre-
maturely closes the door on challenges to school policies that expand the
scope of public authority into areas traditionally regulated within the fam-
ily.90 With regard to the daughter’s claim, the court relies heavily on the
distinction between fundamental rights and mere liberty interests91 before
unflatteringly contrasting the interest she seeks to protect (which it consist-
83 Id. at 389.
84 See Hurley v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995) (noting that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of consti-
tutional protection”; otherwise, the First Amendment “would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollack, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll”).
85 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (“While children [ ]
do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ the nature of those rights is
what is appropriate for children in school.” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)).
86 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 428–32 (9th Cir. 2008) (treating
free speech claim with respect but rejecting it, allegedly, because of strength of district’s
interests).
87 See Blau, 401 F.3d at 394–96.
88 See id. at 395–96.
89 See id. (collecting Courts of Appeals cases rejecting parents’ piecemeal objections to
particular school programming).
90 After all, at its heart, the Supreme Court’s modern substantive due process jurisprudence
focuses on preventing state interference in the kinds of decisions that historically have been—
or as a matter of first principle ought to be—made by individuals, couples, and families with-
out significant governmental interference.
91 See Blau, 401 F.3d at 393–95.
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ently refers to as the right to wear “blue jeans,”92 “jeans,”93 or “dunga-
rees”94) with the fundamental rights acknowledged in the existing
jurisprudence. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit distorts the question presented,
shifting our attention away from whether the state has sufficient reason to
impose broad restrictions on the day-to-day liberty of public school students
and onto the stereotypical temerity of a caricatured teenager who egotisti-
cally believes that her desire to wear a particular garment is on par with the
questions of life, death, and family that adults must navigate and on occasion
litigate.
The Ninth Circuit’s two leading school uniform cases share many simi-
larities with Blau95 and indeed cite Blau positively on one particular point.96
However, those decisions adopt a noticeably different tone and methodology
that treats the students’ claims more respectfully, leading to results that are
more balanced and provisional than those reached by the Sixth Circuit. In
Jacobs v. Clark County School District, a divided panel largely upheld a
Nevada school district’s uniform policies against free speech, free exercise,
and procedural due process challenges brought by student plaintiffs.97 Writ-
ing for the majority, an obviously-conflicted98 Judge Hawkins introduces the
case by noting that “many students, as well as their parents, find [such re-
strictions] offensive to their understanding of core First Amendment val-
ues.”99 Throughout the opinion, the court goes out of its way to identify and
grapple with multiple variations of the plaintiffs’ arguments, and to point out
deficiencies in the district court’s analysis.100 The opinion refers to the plain-
tiffs’ arguments as “appealing,” or a similar term, several times101 (though
sometimes adding a modifier such as “superficially”102). At several points,
the court suggests that some of the details of the district’s dress restrictions
92 Id. at 386, 393–95.
93 Id. at 394.
94 Id. at 393–94.
95 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 434–35 (2008) (agreeing that
student dress restrictions at issue ultimately must pass intermediate scrutiny and that the kinds
of interests offered by school districts in dress restriction cases are “important”).
96 See id. at 435 (quoting Blau’s list of important government interests implicated by stu-
dent dress restrictions).
97 See id. at 423–24. The plaintiffs in this case did not bring a substantive due process
challenge.
98 For interesting speculation by a former clerk about how Judge Hawkins’s own exper-
iences and views of the proper role of a judge likely resolved the case for him, see Thomas
Healy, The Hard Case and the Good Judge, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 39, 45–47 (2011).
99 Id. at 422.
100 See, e.g., Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 427–30 (differentiating between three different kinds of
free speech claims implicit in plaintiffs’ arguments and substantively discussing each); id. at
427–28 (spending several paragraphs seriously grappling with a claim the district court did not
at all address).
101 See, e.g., id. at 429 (“appealing”); id. at 432 (“viable”); id. (“colorable”).
102 Id. at 429.
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might indeed be constitutionally problematic, though declining to provide
relief for reasons specific to the record of the case.103
Ultimately, the majority rejects the plaintiffs’ challenges for reasons
that are unsatisfying but not insensitive. According to the court’s analysis,
the best reading of the record is that the kinds of dress restrictions adopted
by the school district were viewpoint- and subject-matter-neutral and there-
fore subject to intermediate scrutiny.104 Though it acknowledges some ambi-
guity on the point, the court concludes that Tinker’s fairly stringent tests for
restrictions on student speech do not displace the Supreme Court’s general
framework for dealing with content-neutral restrictions.105 Applying that
framework, the court concludes that the restrictions at issue serve important
governmental interests, that those interests are unrelated to the suppression
of expression, and that the restrictions left sufficient alternative mechanisms
for expression.106
In several subtle ways, the majority bends over backwards to make its
decision narrow. First, by employing intermediate scrutiny analysis, it em-
phasizes the fact that, in this particular case, the plaintiffs made no signifi-
cant effort to challenge the school district’s arguments or evidence as to the
importance and utility of the dress restrictions or to build a record indicating
that the district was actually motivated by a desire to suppress expression.107
Second, it drops several breadcrumbs in the opinion hinting at modest chal-
lenges that might succeed against particular uniform provisions or dress re-
strictions.108 Finally, the majority (with one small exception)109 leaves
unanswered the powerful dissent of Judge Sidney Thomas, who criticizes the
majority’s lack of fidelity to the first principles of the First Amendment, its
reading of Tinker’s scope, and its willingness to accept conclusory allega-
tions about the importance of student dress codes unsupported by empirical
evidence.110
The relative flexibility and sensitivity of the Ninth Circuit’s jurispru-
dence on school uniforms led to a peripheral victory for students challenging
103 See id. at 432–33 (noting that school districts start getting close to “the First Amend-
ment’s boundaries” when they permit or require particular visual or written content on clothing
while banning all other content, though ultimately concluding that the deviation from content-
neutral is de minimis where, as here, the only required content is a school logo); id. at 439–40
(agreeing with plaintiff and district court that school’s policy of inquiring into validity and
orthodoxy of religious beliefs before granting religious exemption was prohibited by the Free
Exercise Clause but denying relief because school had abandoned policy and because dress
restrictions were likely constitutional without any religious exemption provision).
104 See id. at 432–34.
105 See Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 429–32.
106 See id. at 435–37.
107 See id. at 436 (emphasizing absence of “any evidence” that policies did not achieve
district objectives); id. (emphasizing absence of “any evidence” that stated reasons were
pretextual).
108 One such challenge would succeed six years later in Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2014), discussed extensively below.
109 See Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 435 n.37 (disputing one of dissent’s factual assertions).
110 See id. at 442–45 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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a school uniform policy in Frudden v. Pilling.111 In that case, several stu-
dents from one family challenged a mandatory school uniform policy that
required students to purchase and wear, among other things, a shirt with the
school logo and motto, “Tomorrow’s Leaders.”112 The only significant ex-
ception to the policy was that students could wear the uniforms of the Girl
Scouts, Boy Scouts, or other “nationally recognized youth organizations” on
days where they had meetings or other events.113 Picking up on hints from
earlier cases,114 a unanimous court concluded that requiring students to wear
clothing containing particular, substantive slogans and offering exemptions
to students who participated in some favored activities presented indepen-
dent problems with the uniform policies, each requiring the application of
strict scrutiny.115 Nothing in the opinion—or in Jacobs—offers doctrinal
support for the kind of broad autonomy- or expression-based claims that one
might have expected in the late 1960s or early 1970s. However, in contrast
with the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Blau, both Frudden and Jacobs reflect a
respect for and a willingness to listen to students that in some small measure
keeps faith with those earlier understandings.
II. CHANGING THE PUBLIC MIND ON STUDENT DRESS RESTRICTIONS:
CONTEXTS AND INFLUENCES
In the twenty or so years following the Vietnam War, public attitudes
and the institutions designed in response to those attitudes shifted in myriad
ways that ultimately worked together to facilitate a new set of norms and
understandings about the policy wisdom and constitutional permissibility of
significant student dress restrictions. Though the cultural discourse in each
of these areas touched only marginally (if at all) upon student dress, and
though most of the individual attitudinal shifts would likely have been insuf-
ficient to reorient popular attitudes about student dress freedoms, they col-
lectively produced a new zeitgeist that permitted—indeed, embraced—the
exercise of pervasive state authority over the dress and appearance of public
school students. This Part traces some of the most significant cultural, politi-
cal, and legal developments that led to the emergence of this new zeitgeist.
A. Trends in Policing
The early 1970s through the early 1990s were the crucial years in the
emergence of the much-chronicled and increasingly lamented phenomenon
111 742 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2014).
112 See id. at 1201–02.
113 Id. at 1206–07.
114 See supra notes 103 and 108 and accompanying text (regarding mottos and logos); R
Frudden, 742 F.3d. at 1207 n.4 (noting that district court in Jacobs expressed concern about
similar scouting exception provision and district withdrew provision before case reached Ninth
Circuit).
115 See Frudden, 742 F.3d at 1206–07.
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of mass incarceration.116 As many scholars have forcefully argued, in the
immediate aftermath of both the civil rights milestones of the 1950s and
1960s and the high profile challenges to public order that characterized the
late 1960s, the United States committed itself to a heavily racialized “law
and order” policy course that involved creating new crimes, imposing sub-
stantially harsher prison sentences for existing ones, and investing stagger-
ing amounts of resources into policing crimes and imprisoning those
apprehended.117 As a result of these changes, the number of Americans in jail
or prison rose from 196,000 in 1972 to 1,159,000 in 1997.118
As Professor Jonathan Simon has persuasively argued, the rise of mass
incarceration did not just affect those arrested and imprisoned, but also
spawned an entire culture oriented around the values and technologies of
policing.119 This trend manifested itself in many ways. On the simplest level,
other institutions adopted the specific tools of policing, such as surveillance,
searches, and the use of uniformed and often armed enforcement personnel.
On a deeper level, however, policing and criminal law enforcement became
the paradigm through which American society identified problems and con-
ceptualized solutions. In arenas as diverse as education, social welfare, and
health care, we became wont to blame problems on the bad behavior of
particular individuals, developing increasingly punitive measures of social
control, and eroding privacy norms in order to monitor and enforce such
policies.120 The language and policies of policing have become for much of
the nation, the signal that we are taking a problem seriously; new (real or
imagined) threats to order and prosperity now require tough language, puni-
tive sanctions, and, often, a new criminal statute.121
116 For two outstanding introductions to the subject, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) and MARC MAUER,
RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999).
117 For a sampling of the scholarship on this issue, see generally ALEXANDER, supra note
116; TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISAD- R
VANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GAL-
LOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); MAUER, supra note 116; R
IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary Pattillo et al.
eds., 2004); Ian F. Haney-Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incar-
ceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social
and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1271 (2004); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of
Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 133 (2011). For an important heterodox take on
the dominant narrative, see JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERA-
TION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
118
MAUER, supra note 116, at 114. R
119 See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANS-
FORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3–5 (2007) (“Americans
have built a new civil and political order structured around the problem of violent crime.”).
120 See Jonathan Simon, Introduction: Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, A Collo-
quium on Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1417 (2002).
121 See Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1669, 1697, 1701 (2012) (explaining how the use of criminal law and policing strate-
gies more generally transmitted the message that schools were taking cyber-bullying
“seriously”).
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Children—and in particular, children of color—were most affected by
this change in policy and culture. As the criminal justice system trended
towards more aggressive law enforcement and less leniency to youth offend-
ers, it drew in many more young people.122 Once in contact with the system,
children faced increasingly hostile institutions. U.S. society largely aban-
doned its century-old experiment with a distinctive juvenile justice system,
reshaped its juvenile courts and correctional institutions to be more punitive,
and adopted laws that tried tens of thousands of juveniles in adult
courts––often incarcerating them in adult prisons.123 These trends produced a
feedback loop: as the number of children charged with crimes and subjected
to serious sanctions increased, public fear of juvenile crime increased. Ulti-
mately, the public became desensitized to the notion that young people were
proper subjects for aggressive policing and punitive sanctions.124
Two decades of punitive policies, often aimed at juveniles, and the
broad embrace of policing and surveillance as mechanisms of social control
were instrumental in reshaping popular attitudes about student dress restric-
tions. Though the connections were rarely explicitly drawn, the points of
contact were everywhere: a society that had chosen to prioritize order over
liberty had little sympathy for the abstract autonomy claims of teenagers; a
nation that had committed to the project of punishment and surveillance was
willing to embrace the high enforcement costs of student dress restrictions; a
country that saw young people as potential subjects of carceral discipline
saw little danger in imposing lesser sanctions such as school suspensions for
trivial offenses; and a people who equated the use of policing techniques
with a commitment to taking a problem seriously were affirmatively looking
for opportunities to demonstrate their commitment to education.
B. Trends in Schooling
The above trends in policing led directly to public schools becoming
sites for aggressive policing, a major shift in policy. As one of this Article’s
authors has extensively chronicled elsewhere, over the last half century (and
122 For one estimate suggesting approximately 250,000–300,000 juveniles are tried in
adult court each year, see NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS:
LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010 REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2011). There are, in addition, approximately 1,000,000 juvenile court cases
filed each year (down from almost 2,000,000 per year filed during the late 1990s). See OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/, archived
at https://perma.cc/T3AM-CFM2.
123 See Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1676–77 and accompanying notes. R
124 This phenomenon was most famously illustrated by the panic over an allegedly im-
pending generation of juvenile “super-predators” that began with conservative criminologists
like John Dilulio, Jr. but was quickly embraced by President Clinton and other leading Demo-
crats at about the same time they embraced school uniforms. For an excellent, brief summary
of the phenomenon that quotes some of the most incendiary rhetoric and demonstrates its
destructiveness, see Robert J. Smith & Zoe Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progres-
sion of Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 425 (2017).
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in particular the last quarter century) both the criminal justice system specifi-
cally and the language and technologies of policing more generally have
embedded themselves into the fundamental character of the public school
experience.125
Students are now quite likely to find uniformed police officers on their
school campuses. A collection of factors, including the perceived prevalence
of drugs and gangs, and the tragic shooting at Columbine High School,
pushed districts to station police officers within schools. By 2009, around
17,000 uniformed police officers were formally assigned to schools.126 By
2017, the Los Angeles Public School District actually had enough officers to
maintain its own police department.127 Police officers stationed in schools
(often dubbed “resource officers”) are usually trained specifically to police
educational environments, and, like police officers not stationed in schools,
they often engage in community caretaking activities. Because police of-
ficers are trained to enforce criminal law, however, they are more likely to
perceive conflict or misbehavior as meriting criminal law intervention,
which may partly explain why the number of students arrested at school has
increased128 and why some situations that clearly do not warrant law enforce-
ment involvement, such as food fights, now may end in arrest.129 The apho-
rism that when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail is applicable
125 See Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1677–84. R
126 See Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement
Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 978 (2009-2010).
127 See What Is the LASPD About . . ., LOS ANGELES SCHOOL POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://
laspd.com/about.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/VQF3-8LBL
(noting that the district employs around 350 sworn police officers).
128 See, e.g., Radley Balko, Putting More Cops in Schools Won’t Make Schools Safer, and
It Will Likely Inflict a Lot of Harm, WASH. POST: THE WATCH, Feb. 22, 2018, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2018/02/22/putting-more-cops-in-schools-wont-
make-schools-safer-and-it-will-likely-inflict-a-lot-of-harm/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.388a
4820c4cc, archived at https://perma.cc/A5F9-6SPU (explaining the increase in the number of
students arrested at school, discussing modern history of expanded police presence in schools,
and quoting and citing emerging literature on these issues). The federal government has, con-
troversially, declined to track the number of arrests occurring in public schools, making the
annual figure elusive. Anecdotal evidence suggests that nearly every large school district saw a
major increase in the number of arrests between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s and cur-
rently facilitates the on-campus arrest of several thousand students each year. Some small and
mid-sized districts, particularly in the South, arrest proportionally even more students. See
generally Balko, Putting More Cops in Schools, supra; Radley Balko, School Police Have
Uncertain Impacts on Student Arrests, Crime Prevention, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 21, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/19/school-police-student-arrests_n_1159124.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/YK95-VFT9 (summarizing data and its limits); Tex. Appleseed,
Texas’ School-to-Prison Pipeline: Ticketing, Arrest & Use of Force in Schools (2010), http://
www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Texas-School-Prison-Pipeline_Ticketing_Booklet_Texas-
Appleseed_Dec2010.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H5G7-JRX5 (over 100,000 students is-
sued misdemeanor tickets in Texas schools every year).
129 See, e.g., Susan Saulny, 25 Chicago Students Arrested for a Middle-School Food Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/us/11foodfight.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/8GR3-HU9Z; Stephanie Chen, Girl’s Arrest for Doodling Raises
Concerns about Zero Tolerance, CNN, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/
18/new.york.doodle.arrest/index.html?hpt=C1, archived at https://perma.cc/NV9D-TN6U.
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here. While the presence of officers on school campuses has generally been
justified by safety considerations, most campus arrests involve non-violent,
non-assaultive behavior.130
Campuses increasingly subject students to police-style surveillance
techniques, including drug-sniffing dogs,131 metal detectors,132 surveillance
cameras,133 bag searches,134 and drug tests.135 Some of that surveillance ex-
tends to the home, as administrators monitor off-campus behavior through
social media and school-issued electronic devices.136
These surveillance tools are embedded in a broader disciplinary system
geared toward inflexible and punitive policy goals. Students who break an
expanding body of school rules often face zero-tolerance policies that man-
date automatic suspensions and expulsions.137 Experts who have studied the
frequency with which youth of color move quickly from the school system
to the prison system (the “school-to-prison pipeline”) consistently cite the
rigidity of zero tolerance and similar policies, the adversarial relationships
they create between young people and authority figures, and the dehumaniz-
ing consequences of repeatedly viewing classes of students primarily as dis-
ciplinary subjects as major causes of that public policy catastrophe.138
130 For a breakdown of the offenses that cause arrests and ticketing, see Tex. Appleseed,
supra note 128. Even when official police officers are absent, students are likely to encounter R
other security officers who often mimic the appearance and mindset of the police.
131 In the 2013-2014 school year, 24.1% of public schools (and 57% of high schools)
reported that they used drug-sniffing dogs on campus. See Nat’l Ctr. For Educ. Statistics, supra
note 6, at 103–05. R
132 In the 2013-2014 school year, about 6% of public schools (and 13% of high schools)
performed either daily or random metal detector checks on their students. Id. at 181–82.
133 In the 2013-2014 school year, 75.1% of public schools (and 89% of high schools)
reported that they used surveillance cameras. Id. at 103–05.
134 In the 2013-2014 school year, 11.4% of public schools (and 26% of high schools)
reported that they conducted random sweeps for contraband such as drugs and weapons. Id. at
181–82.
135 See Board of Educ. of Independent Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1997).
136 Schools often monitor social media activity that students engage in off campus and use
that monitoring to discipline students. See Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1707–10 (discussing and R
collecting cases dealing with school district punishment of students for off-campus social me-
dia activity); see also Catherine Smith & Bianca Bosker, School Administrator Boasts About
Spying On Students Using Laptop Webcams, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 28, 2010 (quoting a
school administrator who says he uses for displaying purposes the webcams on school-issued
laptop computers to record and photograph students in their homes).
137 On the history of zero tolerance policies, see Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1678–80; R
Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational Opportu-
nity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1043–48 (2001);
cf. DEP’T OF EDUC. & DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOL SAFETY, 1998, at 6 (1998)
(finding that most states adopted zero-tolerance policies in and around 1995). While “zero
tolerance” is now a familiar phrase and program, it did not exist as a popular policy until the
mid-1990s, and was, like school uniforms, an educational shift for which President Bill Clin-
ton advocated.
138 See, e.g., Tex. Appleseed, supra note 128; Deborah Gordon Klehr, Addressing the Un- R
intended Consequences of No Child Left Behind and Zero Tolerance: Better Strategies for Safe
Schools and Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 585 (2009).
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Several other significant trends in public schooling function symbioti-
cally with the reconceptualization of students as proper subjects for policing.
As many scholars, including one of the authors of this Article, have ex-
plained, many modern public schools have reconfigured the traditional doc-
trine of in loco parentis (the idea that schools are acting in the shoes of a
parent), re-embracing the disciplinary powers implicit in the analogy while
eschewing the nurturing and developmental responsibilities that traditionally
accompanied those powers.139 Where educators and administrators once saw
themselves as part of a community effort to develop emotionally healthy,
independent, and resourceful citizens, cultural changes and resource limita-
tions have made such engagement more difficult and triggered a shift in
aspirations that rejects such holistic aims as naı̈ve or quixotic.140 Put point-
edly, many educators, administrators, and policy makers have concluded that
public schools lack the capacity to guide the emotional and behavioral devel-
opment of students and must instead rely on blunt sanctioning tools to main-
tain order and facilitate learning.
Concomitant reforms have restructured the learning process itself, as
education activists across the political spectrum have pushed for greater
standardization of curricular materials and pedagogical method and for the
adoption of extensive standardized testing to monitor learning and evaluate
school performance.141 While the wisdom of these changes is extensively
debated and beyond the scope of this Article,142 their consequences for the
culture of public schooling are well established. Facing mandates to teach
particular materials by certain deadlines or suffer their own punitive sanc-
tions, schools across the country alter their calendars and schedules, elimi-
nate activities aimed at social and emotional development, and focus their
attention on pushing particular segments of the academic talent distribution
139 See, e.g., Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1683–84; Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis in the R
Public Schools: Abused, Confused, and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 970
(2010).
140 See Stuart, supra note 139, at 970 (noting that, while “the doctrine would ordinarily be R
understood to require the guardianship qualities of a parent, as being supportive, protective,
and perhaps disciplinary,” modern schools and courts “have focused almost solely on the
disciplinary aspect of the principle”).
141 The major federal legislation to implement curricular standards, impose high-stakes
testing, and hold schools accountable was the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). The most signifi-
cant movement towards standardized curriculum and curricular materials is the highly contro-
versial Common Core Standards Initiative, a collaboration between the vast majority of states
organized by the National Governors Association. See Development Process, COMMON CORE
STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/development-pro-
cess/, archived at https://perma.cc/3RCZ-8SMW.
142 From the beginning, legal scholars joined the debate about the Act’s consequences and
priorities. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004); Michael Heise, The Unintended Legal and Policy Conse-
quences of the No Child Left Behind Act, 86 NEB. L. REV. 119 (2007). For pointed recent
criticisms of high-stakes testing by a leading education policy expert (and a one-time sup-
porter), see generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN
SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010).
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over arbitrary bars.143 This classroom culture creates an impersonal and regi-
mented dynamic along with the sense that there is little time to waste, mili-
tating in favor of dress restrictions and other disciplinary rules aimed at
limiting distraction and ensuring conformity.
C. Trends in Parenting
The widespread acceptance of student dress codes and uniforms has
been facilitated by changes in parenting attitudes and strategies. Many par-
ents are more willing to engage in––or authorize surveillance of––their chil-
dren, to micro-manage decisions that prior generations left to adolescents,
and to go to herculean lengths to protect their children’s educational opportu-
nities and physical safety against threats real and imagined. These trends
have variously been described as “intensive parenting,” “over-parenting,”
and “helicopter parenting,” and have been well chronicled by a variety of
academic and popular authors, including one of the authors of this Article.144
The causes of this phenomenon are complicated—almost certainly in-
volving the increasing age of parents (particularly middle- and upper-class
parents), the narrowing of economic opportunity and the concomitant in-
crease in the resources families must dedicate to status replication, and the
saturation media coverage of high-profile tragedies including the school
shootings at Columbine High School, Sandy Hook Elementary School, and
Parkland High School.145 But its effects on the law are significant and its
effects on the culture profound. While we must be cautious about ascribing
too much motive power to a disproportionately middle-class parenting
trend146 when analyzing a student dress regime that disproportionately af-
fects lower-income students,147 devotees of intensive parenting have been
opinion leaders on this issue—dominating PTAs and community organiza-
143 See generally RAVITCH, supra note 142; see also Christine Hong Cullen, High Stakes R
Testing: Not Just an “Upper Middle Class Problem,” HOUST. CHRON., May 13, 2015, https://
www.houstonchronicle.com/local/gray-matters/article/Seeing-STAARs-6258208.php, archived
at https://perma.cc/A2M7-YKTT (providing a vivid and detailed explanation of consequences
of high-stakes testing for learning environment in one school).
144 The leading academic treatment of this trend is Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-
Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221 (2011); see also Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1715–19; R
Joan Acocella, The Child Trap: The Rise of Overparenting, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 17, 2008,
at 100 (reviewing “[t]he literature on overparenting”); Victoria Clayton, Overparenting:
When Good Intentions Go Too Far, Kids Can Suffer, MSNBC, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/6620793/ns/health-kids_and_parenting/t/overparenting/, archived at
https://perma.cc/7KYR-7EFG; Nancy Gibbs, The Growing Backlash Against Overparenting,
TIME, Nov. 20, 2009.
145 Compare Acocella, supra note 144 (emphasizing necessity and willingness of parents R
to invest resources in setting children up for success), with Gibbs, supra note 144 (emphasiz- R
ing increased anxiety spurred by school shootings, terrorism, and other such crises).
146 See Bernstein & Triger, supra note 144, at 1269–71 (explaining that the intensive R
parenting model is a norm created and practiced primarily by “middle-class parents,” by
which they appear to mean middle- and upper-incomes families).
147 School uniforms are required at only 4% of public schools with under a quarter of their
students eligible for the free and reduced lunch program, but at 53% of those schools with over
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tions, drafting op-eds, and voting overwhelmingly for student dress restric-
tions in polls and referenda.
Parents who support intrusive surveillance of their children by schools
(such as drug testing and cell phone searches) or rules that drastically limit
their children’s appearance and fashion choices appear to be motivated by a
set of interrelated factors. First, these parents are more likely to impose simi-
lar restrictions at home and to justify them as expressions of care, predispos-
ing them to treat school-based restrictions as similarly proper and similarly
motivated.148 Second, parents welcome the assistance of school officials in
setting boundaries for their children, since shifting the responsibility for in-
tensive parenting to outsiders allows for a best-of-both-worlds situation in
which students are surveilled or restricted in ways that parents desire, with-
out forcing parents to bear the emotional and relationship costs of imposing
such restrictions themselves.149 Hence, parents who support school uniforms
often suggest that the main virtue of such policies is that they eliminate the
constant bickering over clothing that pervaded their relationships with their
children before such policies.150 Third, parents are more likely to perceive
their children as potential victims or influencees rather than as potential rule-
breakers or “bad” influences and are, therefore, more likely to embrace poli-
cies that surveil, punish, and provide backstops against extreme forms of
limit testing.151 Finally, anecdotal information suggests that some middle-
class and even affluent parents perceive strict dress codes and school
uniforms as opportunities to opt out of expensive fashion competitions that
they do not want to fund and fear they cannot win.152
D. Trends in Sexuality and Gender Relations
Particularly in recent years, supporters of strict public school dress re-
strictions have deployed a rhetoric that focuses heavily on the sexualization
three-quarters of the students so eligible. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 6, R
at 197.
148 See Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1714. R
149 See id. at 1714–15.
150 See, e.g., Greg Toppo, What to Wear? Schools Increasingly Making That Decision,
USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/18/more-
school-uniforms/2662387/, archived at https://perma.cc/6QFA-ZLJT (quoting a school safety
consultant on why parents embrace school uniforms: “A couple of months down the road, the
parents absolutely love it because they spend a whole lot less time fighting with their children
over what they’re going to wear.”).
151 See Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1715. R
152 Paradoxically, there is substantial evidence that school uniforms actually increase the
cost of clothing and impose hardship on parents struggling to make ends meet. See, e.g., Adam
Clark, Thousands Say They Can’t Afford Uniforms, THE MORNING CALL, Aug. 31, 2013, http://
articles.mcall.com/2013-08-31/news/mc-allentown-school-uniform-implementation-20130831
_1_uniform-bank-northampton-area-school-district-school-uniform-policies, archived at
https://perma.cc/K59W-XZ4Y (reporting that thousands of families could not afford new
mandatory uniforms in one district and would have to either receive public vouchers or send
their kids to school out of uniform).
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of the adolescent female body. This rhetoric likely derives from complicated
trends in sexuality and gender relations that have sexualized young women
and girls of an ever-decreasing age and then punished those same young
people for the power and dangers supposedly implicit in that imputed
sexuality.
In a recent essay, Professor Meredith Johnson Harbach elegantly sum-
marizes the interplay between student dress restrictions and the increased
sexualization of young women.153 Relying on both social science and cul-
tural criticism, she explains that media, advertising, and other influences
have pressed upon both young women and men of all ages an inherently
sexualized account of female adolescence.154 After recounting some of the
many negative consequences of this worldview for young women and for
our culture more broadly, she posits that the inclination towards imposing
modesty-based dress restrictions on female students might, in some in-
stances, be a well-intended but ultimately ineffective attempt to dampen this
trend.155 Drawing upon powerful emerging literature from young female crit-
ics, she catalogs several ways in which this approach is deeply counter-
productive. These include (1) the adverse learning consequences for girls
facing a disproportionate number of dress code sanctions and punishments;
(2) the message that female bodies are “inherently. . . dangerous” or prob-
lematic;156 (3) the concomitant message that responsibility for avoiding har-
assment and assault rests with females rather than males;157 and (4) the
degree to which the promulgation and enforcement of dress restrictions fo-
cused on the female body orient young women and girls who are not already
so conditioned to adopt heavily sexualized identities.158
We concur with the cultural analysis provided by Professor Harbach
and the critics she relies upon, but also wish to emphasize a related cultural
trend regarding young female sexuality that has paved the way for strict
female dress restrictions, a trend that is in some ways the proverbial other
side of the coin. Though it is absolutely true that the last three or four de-
cades have seen the increased sexualization of adolescents and even pre-
adolescents, it is important to understand the nature of that sexualization.
While there are some innocuous and even potentially healthy narratives
threaded into the complex cultural dialogue,159 the dominant strand in the
153 See Harbach, supra note 13. R
154 Id. at 1041–43.
155 Id. at 1042–43 (suggesting that some educators might instinctively believe that obscur-
ing the female body works to diffuse sexual tension).
156 See id. at 1043–45.
157 Cf. id. at 1044.
158 Id. at 1056–57.
159 On the more innocuous (though not completely benign) end of the scale, one might
count the increased integration of (almost always heterosexual) romantic relationships into
television shows and movies aimed at pre-adolescents. On the healthier side of the ledger,
many might count the work of cultural groups that have encouraged young women to embrace
their sexuality as a means of self-empowerment and self-fulfillment. Cf. Margo Kaplan, Sex-
Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89 (2014).
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cultural conversation about young female sexuality has almost certainly been
overtly misogynistic. While a full exploration of these trends is beyond the
scope of this Article, the cultural mileposts in the relevant decades are strik-
ing, including a war on a perceived epidemic of teen pregnancies that de-
rided young mothers, not fathers;160 the development of abstinence-only
sexual education designed to inculcate lessons of shame rather than best
practices for sexual health and empowerment;161 and an avalanche of popular
entertainment portraying young women (and women generally) as tempt-
resses bent on the destruction of order and decency.162 This punitive and
misogynistic cast to the overall theme of adolescent sexualization has further
facilitated the development of strict female-oriented dress restrictions. For
those influenced consciously or unconsciously by this trend, imposing dis-
proportionate consequences and disciplinary resources on young women is
not an unfortunate side effect of an effort to counteract their hyper-sexual-
ization, but instead an intentional and targeted response to it.
E. Trends in Politics
Perhaps the single biggest factor paving the way for the reconsideration
of student dress restrictions during the last quarter of the twentieth century
was a shift in the values, coalitions, and strategies of the two major political
parties that left defenders of broad student freedoms without a base of sup-
port. To a small extent, this was due to shifts within the Republican Party
that increasingly jettisoned moderate and culturally liberal voters in the Mid-
west and Northeast for evangelical voters and law-and-order conservatives
primarily, but not exclusively, in the South.163 But the vast majority of the
blame for this cultural transformation goes to the Democratic Party, and in
particular to the Clinton administration.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a growing faction of the Demo-
cratic Party, despondent over two decades of disastrous election results, con-
160 See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREG-
NANCY (1996) (discussing, with significant skepticism, the rhetoric, politics, and policy de-
bates involving teen pregnancy, particularly since the 1970s).
161 For a history of the federal legislative requirement that schools utilize such a model,
see generally John E. Taylor, Family Values, Courts, and Culture Wars: The Case of Absti-
nence-Only Sex Education, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1053, 1062–64 (2010). For one of
many blistering critiques of such policies, this one by a law professor, see James McGrath,
Abstinence-Only Education: Ineffective, Unpopular, and Unconstitutional, 38 U.S.F. L. REV.
665 (2004).
162 For classic portrayals from this era of women as destructive sexual temptresses, see
BASIC INSTINCT (Canal 1992); FATAL ATTRACTION (Paramount Pictures 1987). On the treat-
ment of women generally and young women in particular in Hollywood film, see generally
STACY L. SMITH, et al., Gender Inequality in 500 Films, ANNENBERG CENTER (2012), availa-
ble at http://annenberg.usc.edu/pages/~/media/MDSCI/Gender_Inequality_in_500_Popular_
Films_-_Smith_2013.ashx, archived at https://perma.cc/4QG3-DNP4.
163 See, e.g., GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, RULE AND RUIN: THE DOWNFALL OF MODERATION
AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, FROM EISENHOWER TO THE TEA PARTY,
339 (2012).
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sciously sought to revise the Party’s substantive policy positions and
messaging to appeal to a broader cross-section of moderate and conservative
voters.164 To that end, the Democratic Leadership Council (“DLC”) and
other affiliated groups proposed that the Party adopt a variety of “tough on
crime” strategies; distance themselves from segments of the Party’s coalition
that were unpopular with swing voters (such as Black Americans and teach-
ers’ unions); support reforms of government benefit programs to limit eligi-
bility and impose work and surveillance requirements for recipients; eschew
costly new government programs for small-bore, “common-sense” initia-
tives; and, more generally, embrace a political rhetoric that resonated with
religious and cultural conservatives.165
President Clinton, elected in 1992, was a former Chairman of the DLC
whose campaign rhetoric and governing philosophy broadly resonated with
its manifesto.166 During his successful campaign, President Clinton made
headlines by attacking popular Black entertainers for their coarse lyrics167
and by rushing home to Arkansas to sign off on the execution of a pro-
foundly incompetent death row prisoner.168 Once in office, his administration
supported and enacted major legislation reforming public benefits programs
to eliminate entitlements and impose work restrictions;169 imposing stricter
prison sentences for federal crimes and stricter procedural requirements on
state prisoners seeking federal habeas review;170 and “defending” traditional
notions of marriage against the first stirrings of the same-sex marriage
164 On the rise of the “New Democrats,” see generally KENNETH S. BAER, REINVENTING
DEMOCRATS: THE POLITICS OF LIBERALISM FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON (2000); Jon F. Hale,
The Making of the New Democrats, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 207 (1995).
165 For an early discussion of the rise of the DLC and its policy positions, see Hale, supra
note 164, at 208–28. For an insider memoir focusing on the DLC’s successes, see generally AL R
FROM, THE NEW DEMOCRATS AND THE RETURN TO POWER (2013). For a story reflecting on the
DLC’s rise and decline, see Ben Smith, The End of the DLC Era, POLITICO, Feb. 7, 2011, http://
www.politico.com/story/2011/02/the-end-of-the-dlc-era-049041, archived at https://perma.cc/
2T85-EHG8.
166 On Clinton’s connections to the DLC and their policy agenda, see FROM, supra note
164, at 161–62; Paul J. Quirk & William Cunion, Clinton’s Domestic Policy: The Lessons of a R
New Democrat, in THE CLINTON LEGACY 200, 200–04 (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman
eds., 2000).
167 See Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton Raps Sister Souljah’s Remarks, WASH. TIMES, June 14,
1992, at A4.
168 See Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 1993, at 105 (dis-
cussing Governor Clinton’s decision to allow execution of Ricky Ray Rector, an individual so
profoundly intellectually disabled that he asked that dessert from last meal be saved “to finish
later”).
169 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
170 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 120005, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). For an insightful early discussion of the Clinton Ad-
ministration’s use of the crime issue, see Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 542–76 (1996). See generally Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in
Clinton’s Crime Control Agenda, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 67 (1997).
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movement.171 His most trusted advisors famously urged him to maintain
popularity by “triangulating” in a manner that presented his positions as an
alternative to both the Republican Party and more traditional Democrats.172
As President Clinton prepared to seek reelection in 1996, he embraced
mandatory school uniforms as the kind of small-bore, low-cost, common-
sense policy initiative that might appeal to a broad cross-section of voters.
President Clinton mentioned uniforms in his 1996 State of the Union ad-
dress,173 gave a full-throated endorsement of them in a famous speech in
Long Beach, California,174 and issued federal guidelines to encourage and
support schools transitioning to uniforms.175 While a few schools had begun
experimenting with uniforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the modern
enthusiasm for uniforms can be traced fairly directly to the 1996 Clinton
administration initiative.176
School uniforms presented a perfect opportunity for President Clinton
to “triangulate” and demonstrate his bona fides as a new kind of Democrat.
On the one hand, the imposition of additional restrictions and greater sur-
veillance on predominantly poor and minority students,177 combined with the
emphasis on diminishing violence and disorder, was a culturally conserva-
tive endeavor designed to resonate with the swing voters the Democratic
Party hoped to win back from the Republicans.178 On the other hand, Presi-
dent Clinton carefully threaded genuine concern for the physical safety and
learning environments of disadvantaged students, as well as arguments pre-
mised on “equality” and “opportunity,” into his case for student dress re-
strictions, in a manner that has proven durable.179 The Clinton administration
wanted to seem committed to a world where order was a priority, where
171 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (ruled un-
constitutional in U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 774 (2013)).
172 For the nearly contemporaneous account that publicized the “triangulation” strategy,
see BOB WOODWARD, THE CHOICE 25–26 (1996).
173 See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 90, 93 (Jan. 23, 1996) (“I challenge all our schools to teach character education, to
teach good values and good citizenship. And if it means that teenagers will stop killing each
other over designer jackets, then our public schools should be able to require their students to
wear school uniforms.”).
174 Remarks Prior to a Roundtable Discussion on School Uniforms in Long Beach, Cali-
fornia, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 368 (Feb. 24, 1996).
175 See generally MANUAL, supra note 48. R
176 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., supra note 6, at 196 (charting rise of uniforms and R
dress codes over the years since Clinton’s public support).
177 See id. at 197 (breaking down use of uniforms and strict dress codes by racial and class
profiles of schools’ students).
178 Cf. James Gerstenzang, Clinton Praises School Uniform Pacesetter, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-02-25/news/mn-39873_1_school-districts, archived
at https://perma.cc/JBB4-H85D (“The entire United States of America is in your debt because
you took the first step to show that elementary and middle school students could wear
uniforms to class, reduce violence, reduce truancy, reduce disorder and increase learning[.]”).
179 For an excellent summary on the complexities of President Clinton’s New Democrat
rhetoric and its implications for law reform, see Linda C. McClain, Federal Family Policy and
Family Values from Clinton to Obama, 1992-2012 and Beyond, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1621,
1627–32 (2013).
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rights and benefits came with responsibilities and obligations, where new
tools were used to fight old problems, and where the cultural priorities and
folk wisdom of “mainstream Americans” were treated with respect. To that
end, it aggressively embraced—and substantially changed the discourse
on—student dress restrictions.
F. Trends in Race Relations
To underscore a point that should already be apparent, the trends in
policing, schooling, and politics discussed above are deeply embedded in the
complicated—and in many ways dispiriting—developments in race relations
and racial control that occurred during that era. As Professor Michelle Alex-
ander and many others have persuasively argued,180 the racist anxieties and
concerns unleashed by the dismantling of legal and political restrictions on
Black Americans during the 1950s and 1960s resulted directly in the devel-
opment of a mass incarceration state post-1970; in Alexander’s evocative
phrase, the decline of the old Jim Crow regime led to the development of a
“New Jim Crow.”181 The racialized narratives that fueled the Jim Crow re-
gime also fueled the embrace by both major political parties of law-and-
order rhetoric, “tough on crime” policies, and normalized surveillance.
These racist narratives dubbed young Black boys as “super predators,”182
used stereotypes and slurs to blame Black crack dealers and users for an
uptick in crime rates more likely attributable to shifting age patterns and
poverty rates,183 and attempted to disqualify Democratic electoral aspirants
from office by tying them to menacing, doctored photos of incarcerated
Black Americans.184 Similarly, the successful efforts to limit once popular
social safety net programs drew their inspiration from a racialized narrative
that characterized benefit recipients as moochers and ne’er-do-wells or, in
the rhetoric of President Ronald Reagan, “welfare queens” driving around in
Cadillacs.185 In the context of these racialized narratives and attendant poli-
cies, the adoption of harsh student dress restrictions (especially uniforms),
180 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 116; Haney-Lopez, supra note 117, at 1029. R
181
ALEXANDER, supra note 116. R
182 See Smith & Robinson, supra note 124, at 425; see also supra note 124 and accompa- R
nying text.
183 On the rhetoric and reality of the crack panic, see Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug
Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 852–59 (2010) and sources cited
therein.
184 On the most famous such episode, involving Presidential aspirant Michael Dukakis and
convicted criminal Willie Horton, see Smith & Robinson, supra note 124, at 423–24. R
185 On the importance of President Reagan’s use of this imagery, which started during the
New Hampshire Presidential primary in 1976, see Kathryn J. Edin & H. Luke Shaefer, Ronald
Reagan’s “Welfare Queen” Myth: How the Gipper Kickstarted the War on the Working Poor,
SALON, Sept. 27, 2015, http://www.salon.com/2015/09/27/ronald_reagans_welfare_queen_
myth_how_the_gipper_kickstarted_the_war_on_the_working_poor, archived at https://perma
.cc/NWZ4-AB4H; see also Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor
Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233, 235–37 (2014).
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and additional surveillance and disciplinary powers in lower income and ma-
jority non-white schools seemed comfortable and familiar for a wide swath
of politicians and opinion leaders.
G. Trends in Market Organization and Economic Incentives
The school uniform movement received an additional boost from some
of the nation’s largest clothing manufacturers and retailers, including
Walmart, Lands’ End, JC Penney, Amazon, Target, French Toast, and The
Gap. School uniforms (and uniform-like solid polos, khakis, skirts, and
dresses) have developed into a billion-dollar-per-year market, providing a
stable base of profits for retailers in the otherwise unpredictable and trend-
driven adolescent clothing market.186 Uniform products fit well into the man-
ufacturing and distribution structures of the modern clothing industry, as
they can be mass-produced at low cost (often through the use of foreign
labor187), are sufficiently standard to be sold at retail outlets throughout the
nation, and require comparatively little advertising or sales assistance. Trans-
mogrifying a significant segment of the adolescent clothing market into a
school uniform market effectively turns that segment of sales from clothing
purchases into the kind of standardized consumer goods that are the bread
and butter of modern retailers.
Though it is unclear whether clothing companies played any role in the
rebirth of student dress restrictions in the late 1980s and 1990s, they have
unequivocally embraced that movement since the beginning of this century.
Store and brand advertisements not only solicit business, but also tout the
value of uniform policies.188 Indeed, the most prominent publicly available
summary of the case for school uniforms is produced by, and bears the insig-
nia of, uniform manufacturer French Toast.189 At least one major retailer has
bankrolled studies meant to marshal evidence in favor of expanding uniform
policies.190 Predictably, companies have launched special lines of uniform-
186 Current estimates of the school uniform market are usually hidden behind expensive
pay walls. One widely disseminated statistic has the industry passing the $1 billion per year
mark by 2015. See Robin Goldwyn Blumenthal, Dress for Uniform School Success, BARRONS
.COM (Sept. 19, 2015), https://www.barrons.com/articles/dress-for-uniform-school-success-
1442637846, archived at https://perma.cc/A3MD-M9QD.
187 As much as 98% of the clothing sold in the United States is manufactured abroad. See
Bradley Blackburn, Clothing “Made in America:” Should U.S. Manufacture More Clothes?,
ABC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2011, https://abcnews.go.com/Business/MadeInAmerica/made-america-
clothes-clothing-made-usa/story?id=13108258, archived at https://perma.cc/88E2-W24Y.
188 See, e.g., infra notes 189–190. R
189 The advocacy documents are available in several pages intermingled with ads. See
School Info, FRENCHTOAST.COM, https://www.frenchtoast.com/category/schoolņfo.do (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2RXT-GEE7. For the oft-quoted summary of
arguments, see Benefits of School Uniforms, FRENCHTOAST.COM, https://www.frenchtoast.com/
category/school+info/more+about+school+uniforms/benefits+of+school+uniforms.do
(last visited Oct. 29, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/QEM8-PKZX.
190 See, e.g., National Survey of School Leaders Reveals 2013 School Uniform Trends,
NAT’L ASSOC. OF ELEM. SCH. PRINCIPALS (July 30, 2013), https://www.naesp.org/national-sur-
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wear, opened uniform “shops” in their stores, and promoted these new busi-
ness ventures with excited press releases meant to enhance investor confi-
dence.191 Perhaps nothing better reflects the increased prominence and
projected permanence of the uniform market as the recent development of
secondary analytical products that—for a substantial fee—provide investors
with information about micro-trends in the economic data related to that
market.192
H. Trends in Law
As the rest of this Part has emphasized, many—indeed, most—of the
pressures and forces that redirected the discourse surrounding public school
dress codes and uniform policies have been external to (even if, by neces-
sity, interconnected with) legal doctrine.193 However, developments within
the law have also made it easier to elide serious analysis of expression- and
autonomy-oriented objections to such codes and policies. To take the most
direct example, the promise of broad student-speech protection briefly of-
fered by Tinker194 has been eroded by a series of cases limiting that case’s
application beyond its own sympathetic facts. Those cases re-empowered
schools to limit and punish student speech based on vague and conclusory
concerns about decorum or paternalistic assumptions about students’ ability
to process complicated issues or handle crude language.195 Those decisions
vey-school-leaders-reveals-2013-school-uniform-trends, archived at https://perma.cc/MQF7-
LA2F (detailing annual survey funded by Lands’ End that consistently promulgates evidence
in favor of uniforms).
191 Walmart both has a physically distinct uniform “shop” in its stores and delineates a
virtual uniform “shop” on its website. See School Uniform Shop, WALMART, https://www
.walmart.com/browse/5438_1086304 (last visited Aug. 10, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/
2GSY-75WS. Lands’ End has offered slightly different names for its products and services
every year, but has made a point of issuing annual press releases trumpeting the importance
and profitability of its uniforms (and other clothing designed to meet strict dress codes). See,
e.g., Growing School Uniform Market Demands Best in Class Service Products, PRNEWSWIRE
(Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/growing-school-uniform-market-
demands-best-in-class-service-products-166929746.html, archived at https://perma.cc/A898-
Q2BR.
192 See, e.g., RESEARCH CORRIDOR, School Uniform Market––School Uniform Mar-
ket––Global Trends, Market Share, Industry Size, Growth, Opportunities and Market Forecast
- 2018–2026 (2018), https://www.researchcorridor.com/school-uniform-market/, archived at
https://perma.cc/VD2D-H9CA (costing $4,000); QY RESEARCH, Global School Uniform Mar-
ket Research Report (Jan. 2017), http://www.researchmoz.us/global-school-uniform-market-re-
search-report-2017-report.html, archived at https://perma.cc/E2PJ-NLQM (costing $2,900).
193 See supra Parts II. B–G.
194 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that
students have First Amendment right to wear armbands protesting Vietnam War in public
schools and setting up speech protective framework for future public school claimants).
195 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986) (allowing school district to
punish student for political speech that used crude imagery); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260–61 (1988) (allowing school to block publication of student
newspaper articles dealing with sensitive subjects such as divorce); Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 393–95 (2007) (allowing school to discipline student for holding up banner at
school-sponsored event with cryptic but arguably pro-drug meaning).
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both reflect and rely upon deeper trends in the regulation of student speech
and behavior that have allowed school districts greater latitude to surveil and
search students and their belongings196 in deference to claims of order and
discipline and in response to a perception that student freedoms are more
provisional than those of adults.197
Doctrinal changes not directly related to schools and children also con-
tributed to the erosion of constitutional space within which to articulate
broad objections to dress codes and uniform policies. Analysis of First
Amendment challenges has become increasingly categorical. Hierarchical
tests define some communicative conduct out of the First Amendment en-
tirely,198 treat protected communicative conduct differently than pure
speech,199 and apply vastly different levels of scrutiny to restrictions on ex-
pression depending on whether a restriction is content-neutral or -specific
and whether, assuming it is content-specific, it is viewpoint-specific or -
neutral.200 Such sorting mechanisms allow for the expeditious and consistent
processing of a high volume of litigation and generally do a good job of
reflecting the First Amendment’s normative commitments. However, these
tests can be unduly rigid, make the outcome of cases turn on arbitrary dis-
tinctions,201 and, most relevant here, tolerate large scale stifling of expression
if the ban is backed by superficially plausible reasons and evenhandedly
enforced.202
Changes in substantive due process jurisprudence in recent decades
have also made it increasingly difficult to formulate autonomy-based chal-
lenges to student dress and grooming restrictions. During the late 1960s and
196 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822–25 (2002) (allowing mandatory
suspicionless drug testing of students participating in extra-curricular activities); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325–36 (1985) (allowing warrantless searches of student lockers on
showing of “reasonable suspicion” rather than showing of “probable cause” required in most
other settings).
197 See generally Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1677–84. R
198 See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (introducing test that
imposes significant requirements as to the precision of the intended message and its intelligi-
bility to its intended audience in order for conduct to be treated as “communicative” and
protected under the First Amendment).
199 See, e.g., id. at 408–09 (adopting what is essentially an intermediate scrutiny test even
for clearly communicative conduct).
200 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222–23 (2015); Turner
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 622–24 (1994); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). For
one leading expert’s take on the increased use of tiered reasoning in free speech cases (and its
limits), see Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free
Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76
ALB. L. REV. 499 (2013).
201 Cf. Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and
the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2342–47
(2006) (sorting through similar normative and practical arguments about the use of tiers in
equal protection analysis).
202 According to some commentators, that is in effect what has happened in school uni-
form and dress code cases. See Miller, supra note 10, 646–49; Ronald D. Wenkart, School R
Uniform Policies, School Dress Codes and the First Amendment: A Fourth Category of Stu-
dent Speech?, 238 EDUC. LAW REP. 17 (2008).
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the early to mid-1970s, as the courts worked to develop and justify modern
substantive due process doctrines that required governments to articulate
sufficient reasons for intruding into personal liberties,203 school districts
struggled to explain why preferences for traditional clothing and hairstyles
were sufficient to trump the inherent right human beings have to shape the
way they look and control how they present themselves to the world.204 Over
the next several decades, however, the Supreme Court, and by extension the
American constitutional system, gradually adopted a grand bargain in the
arena of substantive due process: the more conservative justices have grudg-
ingly accepted the existence of the category of substantive due process205
while the more liberal justices have acquiesced to limiting doctrines that
import tiered levels of scrutiny from equal protection analysis,206 accord little
if any protection to rights not deemed fundamental,207 and adopt narrow tests
(and a rapidly shutting window) for the identification of fundamental
rights.208 Rather than asking the government to provide proportionate justifi-
cation for restrictions on individual autonomy that are acutely felt by those
affected, substantive due process law now requires citizens to demonstrate
that the particular liberty in question has always been historically
respected209 or is on par in terms of ultimate life significance with decisions
such as whether to have children or who to marry210 in order to receive more
than trivial constitutional protection.
203 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
204 See cases discussed supra Part I.B.
205 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 77, 80, 86, 92, 95 (2000) (including
opinions by all nine Justices accepting that substantive due process exists and protects certain
conduct from government regulation); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 736,
756, 789 (1997) (including similar opinions signed by all Justices).
206 For a theoretically rich discussion of the Court’s transition to an analytically troubling
tiered vision of substantive due process, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals:
Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983 (2006).
207 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (applying rigidly the rule
that “fundamental rights” trigger strict scrutiny under substantive due process, but mere lib-
erty interests trigger only rational basis scrutiny).
208 See, e.g., Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (attempting to limit recognition of “fundamental
rights” to a handful of rights continuously protected in our history and tradition).
209 See id.
210 For recent cases emphasizing the centrality of the life decision in assessing challenges
to law restricting individual liberty, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). It
should be noted that only some of the Court’s members have even embraced this alternative
and that those who would jettison this prong of the Court’s current approach may soon form a
majority. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, Brett Kavanaugh is Cherry-Picking
the Cases He Says Count as Precedent, SLATE, Sept. 6, 2018, https://slate.com/news-and-polit-
ics/2018/09/kavanaugh-confirmation-hearings-on-abortion-and-same-sex-marriage-hes-cherry-
picking-precedent.html, archived at https://perma.cc/2Z6P-VNRJ (quoting Supreme Court Jus-
tice Brett Kavanaugh as saying that when it comes to substantive due process “all roads lead to
Glucksberg.”).
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III. LESSONS FOR UNDERSTANDING OUR CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
In recent years, many legal scholars, including one of this Article’s au-
thors, have written extensively about the complicated, extrajudicial process
through which different constituencies collaborate and compete to give spe-
cific content to our constitutional law.211 When theorists discuss this pro-
cess—what one of this Article’s authors has called the operation of
“constitutional culture”212—in the abstract, it can seem a bit obscure or even
bloodless. When, however, scholars embed their analysis in the concrete lan-
guage and characters of particular historical disputes, we get simultaneously
empowering and frightening glimpses of the messy, contingent, and funda-
mentally contested arena of constitutional decisionmaking.213 The preceding
Parts of this Article have engaged in such a demonstration, detailing the
process through which public, academic, and judicial attitudes and assump-
tions about the constitutionality of student dress codes and school uniforms
fundamentally shifted over three or four decades without any significant ju-
dicial decisions on the subject.214 This Part takes the analysis one step fur-
ther, teasing broader lessons about how constitutional law evolves in the
contemporary United States from this rich episode in our constitutional
culture.
A. Indeterminacy in Theory and Practice
The starting point of this analysis is the familiar, if contested, observa-
tion that indeterminacy is the defining characteristic of constitutional law.215
211 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Move-
ments, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and
the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment,
128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014) (exploring the social and cultural factors that increased the
salience of the controversy surrounding Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014)); Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality,
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 128–29 (2013); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002
Term––Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitu-
tional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, (2006); Andrew M.
Siegel, Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Culture, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1067 (2016).
212 Andrew M. Siegel, Constitutional Theory, supra note 211, at 1. R
213 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 211; Klarman, supra note 211; Andrew M. Siegel, Con- R
stitutional Theory, supra note 211. R
214 See generally supra Parts I and II. For a discussion of why cultural attitudes about the
policy wisdom or moral legitimacy of particular government intrusions tend to merge with
popular attitudes about constitutional meaning, see infra Part III.B.
215 See, e.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5–6 (2004) (referring to constitutional law
as “generally quite indeterminate”); Michael C. Dorf, What Really Happened in the Afforda-
ble Care Act Case, 92 TEX. L. REV. 133, 156 (2013) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE
TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM (2013)) (“[A]t
least within the Supreme Court itself, constitutional law is sufficiently indeterminate to permit
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When an important new issue arises, the familiar linchpins of text, history,
and precedent rarely (if ever) resolve the issue and usually leave open many
potential doctrinal paths. The lingering dispute about the constitutionality of
student dress and appearance restrictions underscores this observation with
particular ferocity. Nearly every aspect of the constitutional analysis of the
issue is contestable and fraught with the potential for oversimplification.
Certainly, some of this indeterminacy comes from the particular doctrinal
structures currently in force. Tinker216 and its progeny are ambiguous about
many issues, including the degree to which their protections extend beyond
the realm of political speech,217 the responsibility if any of school officials or
listeners to accept expression that makes them uncomfortable rather than
limit the rights of the speaker,218 and the showing necessary to justify antici-
patory limitations on expression.219 More generally, the courts have done
little to resolve the inherent tension between Tinker’s focus on a concrete and
specific showing of educational disruption and later cases that give broad
deference to school officials to intrude on student freedoms based on con-
clusory concerns about law, order, and discipline.220 Nor have the courts
done much, either in the Tinker context or more generally, to ascertain the
amount of constitutional protection enjoyed by conduct such as dress and
appearance that is intentionally expressive and performative but whose mes-
sage is necessarily subjective and ephemeral.221
Further indeterminacy arrives because the claimed right to attend public
school dressed and groomed as one chooses draws upon multiple constitu-
tional provisions and, thus, has the potential to fall between the stools of
room for effective advocates to argue for nearly any position that falls within the broad main-
stream of public opinion.”); Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning:
A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 603 (1985)
(“While some of the provisions in the Constitution have relatively unambiguous, specific, and
noncontroversial meanings, the language of a great many is so vague, ambiguous, and open-
textured that they might be understood to mean almost anything.”).
216 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
217 On the ambiguities in Tinker and its progeny (which he calls the “Tinker/Morse mud-
dle”), see Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the Student Speech
Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions––for the Law and for the Litigants, 63
FLA. L. REV. 1407, 1432–49 (2011). The Tinker Court emphasized the quintessentially politi-
cal nature of the speech in that case. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
218 For an excellent examination of the degree to which recent lower court opinions have
strained Tinker by allowing for the equivalent of a “heckler’s veto” in the public school con-
text, see generally Julien M. Armstrong, Note, Discarding Dariano: The Heckler’s Veto and a
New School Speech Doctrine, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389 (2016).
219 Professor Moss does an excellent job of explaining the tension in the case law between
Tinker’s promise of a serious Brandenburg-style inquiry into whether student speech actually
poses a significant risk to the educational environment and later cases slide backwards towards
the kind of deferential language that has traditionally appeared in school cases. See Moss,
supra note 217, at 1436–38; see also Jamie B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The R
Triumph and Unrealized Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193, 1195
(2009).
220 See Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (suspicionless drug testing); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (warrantless searches of student lockers).
221 See generally Ramachandran, supra note 13. R
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constitutional doctrines. While the impropriety of the government condition-
ing vital public services on one’s willingness to meet official dress and ap-
pearance norms obviously reflects self-expression concerns, it also resounds
in broader autonomy concerns that are normally protected through substan-
tive due process.222 While a perfect constitutional system might view the fact
that government action threatens multiple normative constitutional concerns
as a point in a claimant’s favor, our constitutional history is largely to the
contrary. With a few notable exceptions,223 plaintiffs have been forced to
choose between existing doctrinal paths, shaping and simplifying their alle-
gations to shoehorn them into existing frameworks.224 When new issues arise
that require such maneuvers, the path of constitutional law becomes even
less predictable.
Even if there were agreement on the relevant doctrinal categories and
their implementation, however, resolution of complicated new constitutional
questions like the legitimacy of strict student dress codes and school uniform
policies would remain indeterminate. This is because existing doctrine and
jurisprudential norms in each of those legal categories require judgments
about history, psychology, and human nature that are contestable and, for all
practical purposes, unresolvable. For example, if substantive due process
doctrine governed, the decisive question would be whether the current re-
gime of strict dress codes and school uniforms reflected traditional state au-
thority or was instead a newfangled modern intrusion on choices historically
assumed to belong to students and their families.225 Under those circum-
stances, it would be child’s play to write learned opinions reaching opposite
conclusions. On the one hand, a rights-recognizing opinion would emphasize
that before the 1960s or even the 1990s, uniforms and written dress codes
were almost totally absent from American public schools, and disciplinary
actions related to dress were ad hoc and infrequent.226 On the other hand, a
222 For a brief summary of this argument, see infra notes 257–260 and accompanying text. R
223 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (weaving together equal pro-
tection and due process claims in striking down state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (weaving together equal protection
and due process claims in striking down provisions of Defense of Marriage Act); Emp’t Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (holding that “hybrid” claims that combine free exercise
claims with other constitutional rights claims receive heightened scrutiny under the Free Exer-
cise Clause).
224 The difficulty of encompassing all of the constitutional concerns raised by a novel set
of facts into one particular doctrinal objection, where doctrine by definition has not yet
adapted to accommodate the particular constitutional problem raised by that set of facts, is
ubiquitous is constitutional law. For one of the author’s exploration of its implications in a very
different context, see Andrew M. Siegel, When Prosecutors Control Criminal Court Dockets:
Dispatches on History and Policy from a Land Time Forgot, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 375–79.
225 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19 (1997) (making such a
question a central inquiry in due process analysis); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
568–79 (2003) (affirming importance of such history and tradition-based inquiries while em-
phasizing that modern assessments of importance of restricted liberty also count in constitu-
tional calculation).
226 See generally supra Part I.A.
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rights-rejecting opinion might emphasize the relative conformity of dress in
public schools throughout American history, the largely unchallenged au-
thority of schools to send students home or impose disciplinary sanctions for
failing to meet unwritten dress norms, and the complete absence of legal
challenges to such attempts before the 1960s.227 Further research into the
frequency of dress-related discipline in the pre-1960 United States might
alter the strength of the case in one direction or another, but even that would
not resolve the issue in any objective way, as the question of whether con-
temporary dress codes and uniforms are a new form of state intrusion or a
characteristically modern manifestation of a preexisting species of regulation
is ultimately one of characterization rather than objective fact.
As another example, assume Tinker and its progeny were interpreted
fairly broadly, requiring the state to produce significant and particularized
evidence of classroom disruption before limiting significant student expres-
sion. Under those circumstances, the outcome of litigation might well turn
on whether choices of student attire and appearance constitute meaningful
“expression.” Once again, one can imagine divergent judicial opinions on
this question (indeed, one need not imagine them).228 Dress code-affirming
opinions would emphasize the multiplicity of reasons why students might
make decisions about their appearance, the lack of specific and concrete
messaging involved in most such decisions, and the indeterminacy and ancil-
lary nature of any communication that might occur. Dress code-rejecting
opinions would emphasize the developmental importance of taking control
of one’s own appearance and the way one presents herself to the world, the
many subtle yet specific messages that are conveyed by particular clothing
and styling choices within particular communities, and the expansive infor-
mation about individuals’ politics, values, and identities communicated to
others by these choices. In this context, the dispute over whether student
clothing and styling choices constitute meaningful expression lacks not only
a determinate answer but also methodologies through which the judiciary
might work towards the answer using traditional legal materials.
B. The Influence of Cultural and Ideological Factors
The second lesson from this episode in constitutional culture should
again be familiar: how we ultimately resolve constitutional indeterminacy
owes much more to cultural factors and popular sentiment than to any
strictly legal factor. Part II demonstrates with striking particularity the wide
variety of cultural and political trends that contributed to the minimization of
sentiment and arguments favoring constitutional protections against strict
public school dress requirements and to the corollary entrenchment of gov-
227 See generally id.
228 See the various opinions discussed supra Parts I.B & I.C.
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ernmental authority to enact such restrictions.229 Individuals who engage
these questions of individual freedom and state authority in 2018 do so
through a very different matrix of attitudes, instincts, and assumptions about
the role of schools,230 the relationship between parent and child,231 the uni-
verse of sanctions appropriate to the enforcement of public order,232 and
other similar issues. In a different project, one might fruitfully work to dis-
entangle the various strands of this shifting worldview, in order to evaluate
their relative importance or to map their complicated interdependence. How-
ever, for this Article, the sheer volume and complexity of these forces only
underscores both our descriptive assertion—that an overdetermined and
overlapping set of cultural and political forces have led to a largely unexam-
ined shift in our underlying constitutional assumptions about the legitimacy
of strict public school dress restrictions—and our theoretical takeaway—that
this is part of the fundamental way in which constitutional law is made in
our contemporary constitutional culture.
While it is hard to imagine a constitutional universe in which major
shifts in cultural attitudes about liberty, equality, justice, and order did not
substantially influence popular (and ultimately judicial) views about essen-
tial constitutional questions, our particular constitutional culture tends to
maximize the overlap between popular morality and popular constitutional-
ism.233 As many scholars have emphasized, our national political culture has
produced a Supreme Court that has adopted a particularly imperial role, re-
serving for itself the functional last word on many, perhaps most, conten-
tious political issues of the day.234 Over the last two decades alone, the Court
has decided issues from the legitimacy of same-sex marriage235 to the valid-
ity of particular policy tradeoffs in national health care legislation236 and
even the selection of the President.237 Particularly in the realm of individual
rights, those judicial decisions are made through a process in which the jus-
229 As noted above, some significant changes in the structure of constitutional doctrine
have also played a role in shifting our assumptions about the constitutional issues implicated
by student dress restrictions. See supra Part II.H. These changes arguably complicate the narra-
tive of constitutional change here, but don’t fundamentally alter it, as those doctrinal changes
are (1) relatively minor in comparison with the cavalcade of cultural and political develop-
ments documented above and (2) themselves, in part, the product of similar cultural and politi-
cal factors.
230 See supra Part II.B.
231 See supra Part II.C.
232 See supra Part II.A.
233 This point is a central theme in most of the works cited supra note 211, particularly R
Horwitz, supra note 211 (discussing cultural and doctrinal overlap in the Hobby Lobby relig- R
ious liberty case) and Klarman, supra note 211 (discussing the cultural and doctrinal overlap in R
recent marriage equality cases).
234 See, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012); Richard A. Posner, Forward: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32 (2005).
235 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
236 See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
237 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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tices seek to reflect on broad textual commitments to generic values such as
equal protection and freedom of speech. In fighting about the contours of
those individual rights, the justices inexorably ponder the contours of those
generic values, frequently cleaving on their meaning into predictable camps
that mirror existing social and political divides. Even when the justices try to
anchor their arguments in traditional legal materials, those materials often
require them to balance competing interests or assess whether an amorphous
standard is met. Those juridical tasks depend for their result on ad hoc as-
sessments of the importance of particular policies or the strength of particu-
lar liberty, dignity, and equality norms.238
Cultural factors outside the courts contribute to the overlap between
popular cultural and political views and popular constitutional thinking. We
live in a sharply partisan political universe in which different cultural com-
munities hold to diametrically opposed visions of both our constitutional
order and of the good faith of particular office holders.239 The communities
and coalitions that lose in the political arena often feel fundamentally ag-
grieved as a matter of principle and have every incentive to take their griev-
ances to court.240 In seeking legal redress, they often are aided by highly
skilled lawyers with legal practices defined by a desire to move the polity
and its principles in particular directions.241 Their cases are then adjudicated
by judges increasingly identified as affiliated with a particular political party
and chosen through a contentious and partisan confirmation process.242
C. The Role of Narrative Entrepreneurs
Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that the cultural factors and popu-
lar sentiments that determine the direction of constitutional law do not
emerge in a vacuum, but are instead sharply influenced by politicians, media
entities, interest groups, and other narrative entrepreneurs.243 The cultural
change and attitudinal adjustments that facilitated a shift in the underlying
assumptions about the constitutionality of student dress restrictions sit at the
238 On the ubiquity of balancing tests in constitutional law, see Aleinikoff, supra note 51. R
On the limits and possibilities of accessing constitutional norms directly in the context of
equality claims, see Siegel, supra note 201. R
239 For a discussion of how these trends influenced one high profile constitutional case, see
Andrew M. Siegel, Constitutional Theory, supra note 211, at 1100–06. R
240 See id.
241 See id. at 1104
242 See id. at 1102–04.
243 The term “narrative entrepreneurs” is borrowed with appreciation from John Fabian
Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 306 (2003). The concept
is familiar, not only because its evocative framing taps into our existing understandings of how
ideas develop but also because it draws explicitly on other classic works on language, ideas,
and politics. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 909 (1996) (coining “norm entrepreneur”); see also PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A
THEORY OF PRACTICE 3–71 (Richard Nice trans., 1977); DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED
TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 8–11 (1987).
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intersection of several areas where politicians and commentators have force-
fully advanced controversial narratives over the last few decades. These ar-
eas include the debate over the lessons of the 1960s,244 concerns about an
alleged decline in law and order and respect for authority,245 the birth of an
entire industry dedicated to competitive criticisms of others’ parenting,246 the
emergence of a dialogue about teenage sexuality that simultaneously sexual-
izes and shames teenage girls,247 and the development of a modern carceral
state dependent on the rhetoric and assumptions of Jim Crow.248 Student
dress codes and school uniforms also directly implicate many of the more
specific stories about modern education, juvenile justice, and race and gen-
der relations that particular educators, politicians, and reformers have relied
upon to forward their policy agendas. Their narratives have become familiar
tropes that dot and ultimately dominate modern discussion of the wisdom
and constitutionality of student dress restrictions: “students killing each
other over shoes,”249 “judge students by the content of their character rather
than the labels on their clothes,”250 “school is a job and [students] need to
be trained to behave professionally,”251 “adolescent girls dress immodestly
and adolescent boys are too easily distracted.”252
The role of narrative entrepreneurs in shaping our constitutional law is
made particularly explicit in this episode by the behavior of the Clinton ad-
ministration, which found in this issue a perfect policy proposal for forward-
ing images of themselves, their Party, and the nation that facilitated their
electoral agenda. The administration’s support for school uniforms was an
explicit part of a triangulation strategy that sought to win reelection and
build an enduring Democratic majority by portraying itself as an exemplar of
244 The debate over what went wrong (and, to a much lesser extent, what went right) in the
1960s has been a staple topic for politicians and commentators of all stripes for decades and is
the subject of hundreds of books. For a smattering of the more academic ones, see supra note
26. R
245 On the early use of the “law and order” trope by figures such as Richard Nixon and
Ronald Reagan to encapsulate the conservative message, see MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND
ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 10–11
(2005).
246 See Ahrens, supra note 121, at 1715–21; see generally Bernstein & Trigar, supra note R
144. R
247 See supra Part II.D.
248 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 116. R
249 The President’s Radio Address, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 366 (Feb. 24, 1996).
250 See, e.g., id. (“School uniforms are one step that may be able to help . . . young
students to understand that what really counts is what kind of people they are, what’s on the
inside.”).
251 Cf. id. (uniforms remind students that “what they’re doing at school is working”);
Andrew Hay, School’s Strict Dress Code Nets 200 Detentions and a Rebellion, N.Y. POST,
Nov. 14, 2014, https://nypost.com/2014/09/14/schools-new-strict-dress-code-leads-to-200-de-
tentions/, archived at https://perma.cc/K95R-M9NQ (discussing massive rebellion after strict
dress code named “Dress for Success” was implemented at one New York High School).
252 For one of many blunt and forceful responses to this trope that marvels at its ubiquity,
see Laura Bates, How School Dress Codes Shame Girls and Perpetuate Rape Culture, TIME,
May 25, 2015, http://time.com/3892965/everydaysexism-school-dress-codes-rape-culture/././,
archived at https://perma.cc/PV9V-LKNN.
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a new kind of Democrat who recognizes the breakdown of law and order and
community standards, is willing to criticize traditional Democratic constitu-
encies like Black Americans and public school personnel, and prefers to deal
with problems through tough love and common sense solutions rather than
expensive social programs.253 In service to those ends, the administration
embraced and amplified many of the tropes mentioned above, wedding them
to thick policy documents that transformed the very terms in which parents,
district officials, and ultimately the courts discussed and evaluated public
school uniform policies.254
D. Of Timing, Path Dependency, and Missed Opportunities
In reshaping the legal landscape regarding student dress codes and
school uniforms, the Clinton administration and other post-1980 narrative
entrepreneurs took advantage of another important characteristic of our con-
stitutional culture: when it comes to the evolution of constitutional doctrine,
timing is often everything.255 While shifting cultural and political forces have
a profound effect on the shape of constitutional law, most observers agree
that law does not always or predictably move in lockstep with shifting norms
and values.256 To the contrary, legal doctrine is often “sticky,” refusing to
budge for some time or in some places or to some degree even after popular
sentiments and habits of thought have shifted.257 While many different vari-
ables determine the extent to which particular doctrine and modes of consti-
tutional analysis are resistant to cultural change, one of the most
straightforward and crucial of those variables is how thoroughly and for-
mally prior generations embedded their constitutional instincts and decisions
into formal doctrine.
Part I.A chronicled the failure of the legal culture of the late 1960s and
early 1970s to embed its constitutional conclusions about student dress re-
253 This story is recounted supra Part II.E.
254 See MANUAL, supra note 48; Clinton, supra note 249; supra Part II.E. R
255 For a thorough treatment of the role of timing in directing and limiting legal change,
see Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001). For the classic argument that constitu-
tional law effectively operates as a system of common law decision-making, see David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (1996).
256 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 18 (2d ed. 1985)
(explaining that while the most important ingredient in law is change, “part of the law is . . .
layer on layer of geological formations, the new pressing down on the old, displacing, chang-
ing, altering, but not necessarily wiping out what has gone before . . . [s]ome of the old is
preserved among the mass of the new.”); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) (cataloging and theorizing about ways in which critical legal scholars
have problematized and complicated relationship between legal and social change); Hathaway,
supra note 255 (discussing path dependence). R
257 For a recent article that theorizes in depth about the causes and consequences of consti-
tutional “stickiness,” see Ozan O. Varol, Constitutional Stickiness, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 899
(2016).
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strictions into legal doctrine.258 Emboldened by the very ideas that shaped
those constitutional conclusions, many educators enthusiastically embraced
student dress freedom,259 while others voluntarily acceded to the new norms
rather than engage in quixotic political and legal battles. For reasons in part
predictable and in part nominal, no case made its way to the Supreme Court
and very few were decided even by the federal courts of appeals.260 To the
extent that the courts struck down student dress restrictions during this era,
their decisions tended to be fact-bound and focused on the particular legal
norms and constitutional provisions most closely associated with those par-
ticular facts.261 While the cases shared a coherent set of background assump-
tions about citizens, the state, autonomy, and expressive freedom, they were
not litigated by one team of lawyers as part of a cohesive national litigation
campaign, and no major scholar or commentator came along to draw the
connections and smooth out the edges.262
To be fair, the failure of the legal actors who resisted and overcame
student dress restrictions in the 1960s and 1970s to consolidate their suc-
cesses into enduring doctrine owed a great deal to doctrinal developments
beyond their control, in particular the Supreme Court’s timid handling of the
first round of significant modern substantive due process cases, beginning
with Griswold v. Connecticut.263 While contemporary substantive due pro-
cess law is grounded in a constitutionalized respect for autonomy,264 the Su-
preme Court took a circuitous route to get there. Worried about repeating the
mistakes of the Lochner era,265 the Griswold Court declined even to admit
that it was invoking substantive due process and grounded its decision in a
free-floating “right of privacy.”266 Moreover, in part to ground this new
“right” in the rights enumerated by the Bill of Rights, the content of that
right to “privacy” focused on spatial—rather than decisional—privacy.267
While the Supreme Court began to turn its doctrinal ship in 1972 in Eisen-
258 See supra Part I.A.
259 See, e.g., Scriven & Harrison, Jr., supra note 42. R
260 Note that all the federal courts of appeals cases from that era involved the distinct
problem of hair length restrictions.
261 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. R
262 The ad hoc advocacy in this area runs counter to the trend of coordinating public inter-
est litigation campaigns that began with Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP’s campaign
against school segregation, see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATION, 1925–50 (1987), and has only gained steam in recent decades on both sides of
the political spectrum.
263 See 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
264 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1992).
265 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating after aggressively scruti-
nizing New York maximum hour and minimum wage legislation for bakers on grounds that it
violated substantive rights implicit in Due Process Clause, in decision that came to be repre-
sentative of the excesses of an era).
266 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481–86.
267 Id. at 485 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”).
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stadt v. Baird,268 that decision was subtle and its ramifications for the emerg-
ing law of substantive due process were not fully appreciated until long after
the first round of litigation over student dress and appearance restrictions
had petered out. It was not until the 1990s that a majority of the Court fully
embraced a substantive due process jurisprudence that graduates the state’s
burden based on the importance of the decision at issue for individual self-
definition.269
IV. RECONSIDERING THE RECONSIDERATION: STUDENT DRESS FREEDOMS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES
Thus far, we have narrated, explained, and drawn lessons from a curi-
ous recent episode in the history of American schooling and civil liberties. In
this Part, we return to the present and confront—on their merits—the under-
lying constitutional issues that make the subject of the prior sections poign-
ant and important. After immersing ourselves in these issues for several
years, we remain convinced that a persuasive brief can be written arguing
that public school students have a broad substantive due process and/or free-
dom of expression right to make decisions about their own attire and appear-
ance. Given the dominant contemporary assumption to the contrary, that
conclusion is noteworthy and crafting the arguments for such a brief would
be a worthy use of scholarly time.
Still, after much consideration, we will offer no such exercise in this
Part. In the end, it would simply be inconsistent with the methods and con-
clusions of this Article to suggest that there is a single right answer to the
question of whether the Constitution affords public schools the authority to
condition the receipt of public education on a willingness to conform to offi-
cial uniform or dress code policies, let alone that we might have privileged
access to that answer.270 Instead, this Part explains why the central normative
concerns raised by students challenging such dress policies resonate with the
values the Constitution’s individual rights provisions are designed to protect,
268 See 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (locating fundamental right to access contraception in the
individual rather than in the couple and in concepts of decisional privacy and autonomy rather
than spatial privacy).
269 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.”).
270 To be clear, we are not arguing that there is never a constitutional case with a “right
answer” or that we cannot rationally assess some constitutional arguments as “better” or
“worse.” Rather, we are suggesting that when a complicated new issue arises that raises plau-
sible constitutional claims, (1) there are often a variety of constitutional resolutions that “fit”
with our existing doctrine and traditions, and (2) the ultimate decision of which path to choose
is not made by the judiciary in a vacuum but instead reflects myriad political, cultural, social,
and intellectual developments that influence the courts’ ability to see—and comfort level
with—different doctrinal narratives. See generally supra Part III.
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and draws sustenance from principles the Supreme Court has articulated in a
wide variety of individual rights cases. It is not so much that the Constitution
requires us to protect student dress freedoms, but instead that it leaves us
room to do so.271
A. Why School Uniforms and Strict Student Dress Codes are
Normatively Problematic
At various points, we have described, and occasionally endorsed, some
of the core normative criticisms of school uniforms and strict public school
dress restrictions.272 This section summarizes the central arguments with an
eye towards identifying how these arguments resonate with the text and doc-
trinal history of the Constitution’s individual rights provisions.
The first—indeed, the core—objection to school uniforms and strict
student dress codes is that such policies interfere with the basic human right
to define oneself and to develop one’s own identity at the moment in human
development where the need to create and assert self-identity is most acute
and developmentally important.273 While, of course, no civil society can ex-
ist if every individual has an unfettered right to behave as she wishes in
pursuit of a self-defined identity, modern liberal democracies strive to create
space for individuals to make autonomous choices about their values, priori-
ties, and affiliations.274 Our textbooks measure our progress as a nation by
charting our respect for this principle and our political vocabulary christens
other nations as “totalitarian” for their failure to acknowledge its sway.275
271 This Part intentionally seeks to use rational argument and values-driven reflection to
modify the background assumptions that shape constitutional discourse about student dress
restrictions. In so doing, it relies upon one of the most intriguing characteristics of constitu-
tional culture: the fact that the beliefs and assumptions that shape our constitutional path “re-
flect deep commitments, guttural instincts, and inchoate understandings” but are also
“responsive to rational argument and intentional modification.” Andrew M. Siegel, Constitu-
tional Theory, supra note 211, at 1071. R
272 See, e.g., supra notes 73–94 and accompanying text (sharply critiquing leading appel- R
late decision); supra Part I.D (endorsing feminist critique of gender implications of most strict
dress codes).
273 For one of the many core psychological texts that make this point explicitly, see ERIK
H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
274 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (“The Constitution
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”); Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“But our society—unlike most in the
world—presupposes that freedom and liberty are in a frame of reference that makes the indi-
vidual, not government, the keeper of his tastes, beliefs, and ideas.”); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly
the marketplace of ideas. The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide expo-
sure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted).
275 On the absence of autonomy and the lack of trust in the people to manage their own
affairs as the trigger of “totalitarianism,” see, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS
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Attire and appearance are arenas in which young people have historically
had significant space to work through complicated questions about who they
are, what they value, and what messages about themselves and the world
they want to present, and to do so on a canvas free of significant long-term
consequences. School uniforms and strict student dress codes short circuit
this development, with both immediate and long-term consequences to stu-
dents’ autonomy and to society’s democratic health.
An expression-based critique is often subsumed within this autonomy-
based objection but deserves independent explication. The right to make au-
tonomous decisions has value in and of itself, but, in many areas, including
notably dress and appearance, individuals seek autonomy not to escape pub-
lic notice but instead to articulate a message, to identify themselves to
others, and to facilitate the formation of both individual relationships and
affinity groups. Clothing and appearance are central, not superficial or triv-
ial, aspects of autonomy because of their critical role in facilitating the com-
munication of complicated and sometimes inchoate ideas, emotions, and
affinities.276 How we dress and style our appearance often signals political
affiliation, religious belief, sexual orientation, or some other core aspect of
identity, either expressly or through relatively straightforward iconography.
Even when it doesn’t, however, it still encodes a complex set of ideas and
attitudes about standards of beauty, commercial culture, gender performativ-
ity, and myriad other issues of paramount public and personal concern. The
very density of our ideas on these subjects precludes us from reducing them
to a slogan on a t-shirt; instead, we deploy the rich semiotics of appearance
and clothing to present a personalized manifesto to the world.277 These ex-
pressive interests peak during the secondary school years where, through an
iterative process, young people are discovering both the content of the ideas
they hope to convey to the world and the semiotic vocabulary necessary to
make themselves heard.278
Student dress restrictions also face normative criticism for their limited
utility and self-defeating aspects. This criticism serves both as an indepen-
dent argument against such restrictions and as an explanation for why the
state has not even come close to meeting the burden it faces when limiting
CRITICS 262 (1989); CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1932); DAVID SPITZ, PATTERNS OF ANTI-DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
127 (1965); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 285 (1983); see also Raskin, supra note
219 (emphasizing anti-totalitarianism language at heart of Tinker). R
276 See, e.g., Taylor Flynn, Instant (Gender) Messaging: Expression-Based Challenges to
State Enforcement of Gender Norms, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465, 491 (2009)
(stating that messages sent by transgender students through gender expression may be very
complex); Ramachandran, supra note 13, at 13. R
277 For some of the classic sources on the dense semiotics of fashion and appearance, see
generally ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM (Matthew Ward & Richard Howard trans.,
Univ. of Cal. Press 1990) (1967); UMBERTO ECO, Lumbar Thought, in TRAVELS IN HYPERREAL-
ITY 191 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1986) (1967); CHARLOTTE PER-
KINS GILMAN, THE DRESS OF WOMEN (Michael R. Hill & Mary Jo Deegan eds., 2002).
278 See ERIKSON, supra note 273. R
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important autonomy and expression interests.279 Nearly a quarter-century
into our modern experiment with student dress restrictions, there is very lit-
tle empirical evidence that such rules improve student performance, increase
school safety, or create more inclusive communities.280 One of the prime
justifications offered for these restrictions is that they remove distractions
and allow teachers and students to focus on academics. But the evidence
instead suggests that interpretation and enforcement of dress restrictions
have themselves become a major distraction, siphoning teacher and adminis-
trative resources from core educational issues and creating an unnecessarily
adversarial relationship between students and educators.281 Teachers and ad-
ministrators are forced to devote time and attention to tasks like measuring
hem lengths and evaluating cleavage exposure, leaving them less time to
teach or to monitor genuinely problematic behavior. In fact, teachers and
administrators may be tempted to focus on dress code violations at the ex-
pense of less visible issues because dress code rules are fairly straightfor-
ward compared to many other areas in which students may require
cultivation or intervention. From an administrator’s perspective, a uniform
requirement may be both easier to implement and simpler to point to as a
tangible accomplishment than improving graduation rates or college place-
ments. Furthermore, students disciplined for noncompliance with restrictive
dress policies may sacrifice educational instruction time to change clothes or
to serve a suspension.282 Students who know that adults are scrutinizing their
279 This argument is made in detail and with empirical precision in BRUNSMA, supra note
1, at 107–97. It has also been made repeatedly by students subjected to such restrictions. See, R
e.g., M. Alex Johnson, Students, Parents Bare Claws Over Dress Codes, MSNBC, Oct. 18,
2008, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26875980/ns/us_news-education/t/students-parents-bare-
claws-over-dress-codes/, archived at https://perma.cc/KS93-PURM (quoting a sophomore
high school student who stated that dress codes don’t “fix the disease” of gang violence but
instead “just cover[ ] the symptoms”); Joel Stonington, Letter to the Editor, School Dress
Codes—Young People Need the Chance to Reflect Identity in Clothes, SEATTLE TIMES, Sep. 3,
1994, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19940903&slug=1928587,
archived at https://perma.cc/VHK6-ZA89 (incoming high school student emphasizes the cost
to identity versus the limited utility of dress restrictions); Li Zho, The Sexism of School Dress
Codes, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 20, 2015, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2015/10/school-dress-codes-are-problematic/410962/, archived at https://perma.cc/
Z2WG-CJ5M (weighing sexist dress codes for girls against their marginal benefits).
280 For a summary of the evidence, see BRUNSMA, supra note 1, at 107–97. R
281 As discussed supra Part II, the enforcement of student dress restrictions has merged
with a broader trend in which American public schools have increasingly reconceptualized
themselves as sites for the policing of young people. Schools deploy surveillance and disci-
plining techniques developed in the criminal justice arena to maintain order and to de-empha-
size other educational objectives, such as nurturing emotional and social development or
encouraging independent academic initiative and critical thought.
282 In one nationally reported incident, a principal disciplined a seventh-grade student for
sporting an untucked shirttail in violation of her school’s dress code provision, sending her to
in-school suspension to hand-copy the school’s multi-page dress code. When confronted about
her decision, the principal commented, “[s]he’s a good kid, but my job is to make sure stu-
dents follow our school’s Code of Conduct, which includes the dress code.” Danielle O’Neal,
North Carolina Middle School Student Suspended for Untucked Shirt, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct.
19, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/19/danielle-oneal-north-caro_n_1987890
.html, archived at https://perma.cc/THP5-JBVW.
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clothing choices to see if those choices are provocative or revealing are
made uncomfortable by the administrative gaze.283
School uniforms and strict dress codes are also normatively problematic
from an equality perspective, as they condition receipt of governmental ben-
efits on adherence to a state-imposed orthodoxy of taste and aesthetic values,
without respecting the degree to which norms of dress and styling reflect
religious affiliation, cultural and ethnic background, and class norms. Al-
most by definition, a dress code or uniform will include items that some
people find objectionable and exclude things that some people will find rea-
sonable. Public school dress policies, particularly uniforms, impose a
majoritarian mandate on a pluralistic society. In doing so, the state fails to
recognize or accommodate the disparate cultural consequences of imposing
a particular subculture’s vision of proper attire on students and families with
different backgrounds and values. While Americans go to work in a wide
variety of outfits,284 the school uniform movement attempts to attire children
for a trip to the yacht club.285
More concretely, such uniform policies exclude and punish on axes of
race, religion, and, often explicitly, gender. In terms of both written policies
and enforcement, the brunt of student dress codes often fall most heavily on
racial minorities. For example, many dress codes prohibit head gear or low-
hanging pants, clothing choices administrators more commonly associate
with Black students.286 Black students are more likely than white students to
be called out by officials for violating such provisions, are more likely to
283 See, e.g., S. Parker, The “Inappropriate Outfit” That Got My Daughter in Trouble at
School, HUFFINGTON POST, May 23, 2012 (updated Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/sparker/daughter-inappropriate-outfit-school_b_1539939.html, archived at https://perma
.cc/T6UC-3KSH (“Imagine sitting in a class where you knew the teacher was literally looking
through your clothing to see you as a provocateur? . . . It turns out that the principal himself
had personally identified her as inappropriately dressed. He had walked up to her during lunc-
htime and identified her crime where nobody else could. I can’t help but think that the princi-
pal’s action creates an unhealthy atmosphere in his school.”).
284 To the extent that the orthodoxy of taste is intended to mirror workplace clothing ex-
pectations, that reasoning is problematic. Schools are not workplaces for children, and analo-
gies between the two generally end up being circular. Those comparisons also do not recognize
that “workplaces” vary widely. Some people wear uniforms to work, although uniforms rarely
include navy blazers or plaid skirts. Some workplaces are business casual, which itself is a
capacious category. Some brick-and-mortar workplaces are comfortable with jeans, and some
“workplaces” involve a chair at a computer in the employee’s home office. If yoga pants are
unacceptable work attire, that information will come as a surprise to a nation of suburban stay-
at-home mothers ferrying children to school and picking up groceries in bulk at Costco while
wearing them. Arguing that students need to dress as if they are going to work is problematic
with a workplace (and a culture in general) that is increasingly informally dressed.
285 School uniforms, of course, vary from school to school, but more often than not require
solid-colored or striped polo shirts and pants or skirts in neutral colors. For a visual gallery of
some of the more common uniform styles, see French Toast: School Uniforms for Girls and
Boys, FRENCHTOAST.COM, https://www.frenchtoast.com (last visited Sep. 16, 2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/RFX4-3XXR.
286 It should be emphasized that the Article is not arguing that Black students are more
likely to engage in inappropriate clothing choices but rather that our judgments about what
clothing choices are inappropriate are shaped by racial bias and stereotypes.
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have their innocent choices of clothing color treated as indicia of gang affili-
ation, and consistently report being cited for exposing amounts of skin for
which their white counterparts are not punished.287 Such restrictions also im-
pose substantial burdens on students whose religion requires or prohibits
wearing particular clothing; they are, at minimum, required to consistently
invoke exceptions to broad policies and are often denied such accommoda-
tion unless or until they seek judicial intervention.288
In recent years, a new generation of feminist activists has articulated a
profound gender-based critique of student dress codes, drawing public atten-
tion both to the fact that most of the restrictions in public school dress codes
apply exclusively or disproportionately to female attire and to the retrograde
gender assumptions used to justify this detailed policing of the female
body.289 While it is impossible to do justice to their arguments in a few
sentences, a short list of their concerns underscores both the normative
power of their critique and its connection to our constitutional tradition:
Young women are subject to more specific limitations on their expression
than young men. They are required to spend more time and emotional en-
ergy on ensuring compliance with state appearance standards than young
men. They are asked to curtail their self-expression not for their own benefit
but for the benefit of young men who are allegedly distracted by sharing
public space with women. Their permission to enter public space is condi-
tioned on acquiescence to a state-sanctioned gaze that draws attention to
their bodies and conceptualizes them as potential sex objects rather than
equal members of a learning community. These norms and assumptions are
enforced through the literal gaze of adult school officials (mostly male) who
287 See, e.g., DANIEL J. LOSEN, DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL
JUSTICE 7 (Kevin Welner ed., Nat’l Educ. Pol’y Ctr., 2001) (finding that Black students in
North Carolina school districts were suspended on dress code violations almost six times the
rate of white students); see also Rebecca Klein, Ohio School Apologizes After Attempting to
Ban “Afro-Puffs” and “Twisted Braids,” HUFFINGTON POST, June 25, 2013, http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/ohio-school-afro-puff-horizon-science-academy_n_3498954.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/99LL-TPJ9; Rebecca Klein, Tiana Parker, 7, Switches Schools
After Being Forbidden From Wearing Dreadlocks, HUFFINGTON POST, Sep. 5, 2013, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/05/tiana-parker-dreads_n_3873868.html, archived at https:/
/perma.cc/B8MU-2K28.
288 See, e.g., Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D.
Tex.1997) (granting relief to student denied permission to wear rosaries to school based on
strict interpretation of school dress code).
289 See, e.g., Harbach, supra note 13; Shannon McMahon, How Dress Codes Makes R
Things Worse for High School Girls, BOSTON.COM, May 14, 2015, https://www.boston.com/
news/national-news/2015/05/14/how-dress-codes-make-things-worse-for-high-school-girls,
archived at https://perma.cc/B8MU-2K28. Female students and their parents have increasingly
resisted the implementation of sexist dress codes. See Donna St. George, Are Leggings Too
Distracting? A Mom Takes on a “Sexist” School Dress Code, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/are-leggings-too-distracting-a-mom-takes-
on-sexist-school-dress-code/2016/11/05/2c677b00-960e-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html
?utm_term=.c7d717b0f61f, archived at https://perma.cc/W7AP-U7U7; Cecilia D’Anastasio &
Student Nation, Girls Speak Out Against Sexist School Dress Codes, THE NATION, Aug. 27,
2014, https://www.thenation.com/article/girls-speak-out-against-sexist-school-dress-codes/,
archived at https://perma.cc/9WU4-AX5Q.
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are required to view young women sexually in order to assess their compli-
ance with dress restrictions. And this entire narrative reinforces scripts and
assumptions about gender and sexuality that misplace responsibility for sex-
ual violence on its victims.290
One final strand of normative critique of strict student dress codes fo-
cuses on the potential for arbitrary enforcement of such codes by state ac-
tors.291 When busy state actors, such as teachers or administrators, are
required to apply vague, complicated, or ill-defined standards to large num-
bers of students moving quickly through the hallways of public buildings,
they are set up to fail at the basic democratic objective of fairly and consist-
ently applying governmental authority. Teachers will interpret ambiguous
terms differently or make different judgments as to what battles are worth
fighting. Administrators will focus their limited enforcement resources on
students who are already on their radar. Students who, because of their age,
development, or race are perceived as more sexualized will draw discipline
for rule-violating attire that will be ignored when worn by other students.
And all of this taken together will create among students both a perception
and a reality that they are at constant risk of arbitrary and unpredictable
confrontation with state actors carrying punitive powers.
B. Why These Normative Concerns Resonate with Existing
Constitutional Doctrine
The normative concerns expressed by critics of strict student dress re-
strictions do not simply reflect the values and policy preferences of those
critics; instead, they draw explicitly on the values and policy choices embed-
ded in our constitutional rights tradition. While it would be a stretch to argue
that existing case law requires courts to strike down public school uniforms
and strict student dress codes, this section argues that such a holding would
be broadly consistent with prevailing law and would fit better with our fun-
damental constitutional values than the alternative approach we appear to be
drifting towards. To provide public school students with significant constitu-
tional protection for their dress and appearance choices requires little more
than taking seriously ideas the courts have already articulated when explicat-
ing the structure and content of our constitutional rights.
1. Substantive Due Process and Decisions that Define Autonomy
Under modern doctrine, substantive due process distinguishes between
the decisions that belong to the state as a matter of normal social ordering
and those that are reserved to the individual absent overriding state justifica-
290 See generally supra Part II.D and sources cited supra note 279. R
291 This concern is largely, though not entirely, absent from school uniform policies,
whose more specific terms leave less room for ambiguity and arbitrary enforcement.
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tion.292 History and tradition provide crucial guidance in differentiating be-
tween these two categories,293 but, at its heart, the key inquiry involves the
nature of the decision at issue.294 As the decisions become more personal,
more important, and more central to the development of individual identity,
the likelihood that the decision belongs to the individual increases; as Jus-
tices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter famously argued, autonomy demands
that some decisions are made free from “the compulsion of the State.”295
While it is true that these words—and the principles behind them—have
largely been deployed in the context of delineating a small subset of “funda-
mental rights,” they also portend a broader approach to calibrating the rela-
tionship between citizen and state. As many scholars have argued, the very
logic of modern substantive due process suggests that all restrictions that
impose on essential aspects of autonomy are subject to genuine constitu-
tional scrutiny requiring the state to justify incursions with meaningful evi-
dence of proportionate harm.296
Governmental rules that condition access to public education on adher-
ence to strict dress and appearance codes are an ideal arena in which to prick
out a deeper understanding of the constitutional significance of these auton-
omy principles. Schooling is an area in which the state has a profound cul-
tural—and legal—obligation to provide services to its citizens on equal
terms.297 Perhaps for that reason, it is an area in which the state has not
traditionally imposed broad dress or appearance restrictions, instead relying
on private ordering or subtle pressure to maintain norms.298 The subject of
such restrictions is deeply personal, involving the presentation of the corpo-
real form. It is also deeply important to the individual and crucial to the
process of self-definition and identity-formation. On the other side of the
ledger, the state can present little if any justification for a code of regulation
in this area beyond generalized appeals to abstractions like “order.” Indeed,
292 See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1992) (discussing
that the decision whether to continue a pregnancy to term is reserved to individual absent
overriding state interest) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (discussing the decision of consenting adults to engage in
sexual intimacy is reserved to the individual).
293 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721–22, (1997); Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 578; United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 762–65 (2013).
294 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 794.
295 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; see also id. at 851 (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.”). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that this language,
which he derides as the “famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage,” “ate the rule of law”).
296 See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 206 (arguing for such an approach). R
297 See NASAW, supra note 16; JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW, Ch. 1, § 1.01, Lexis (Mat- R
thew Bender & Co. 2018). Some states make an express commitment to public education as
being a “paramount duty” of the state, see, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; WASH. CONST. art.
IX, § 1, or being “essential.” See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 229–30 (1982) (suggesting that groups of students cannot be categorically excluded
from provision of public education for superficial or punitive reasons).
298 See supra Part I.A.
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given the historic function of public schools as a venue for the development
of autonomous citizens and moral agents,299 the new restrictions appear both
ironic and counterproductive.
2. Communicative Conduct and Identity
First Amendment law recognizes that the freedom of expression en-
compasses a wide variety of conduct intended to communicate political and
social ideas, even when the underlying conduct—such as the destruction of a
draft card or spending money—is not inherently expressive.300 Here, the con-
duct in question—styling one’s appearance and determining how to present
oneself for public consumption in a public school setting is inherently richly
communicative.301 The case for according this particular form of expression
serious constitutional protection is enriched by the Court’s own discussion of
the central purposes of the First Amendment: student decisions regarding
their dress and appearance frequently encapsulate commentary on particular
social, cultural, and even political issues;302 play essential roles in cementing
associations;303 and inherently involve the development of an autonomous
voice and individualized identity.304 Taking dress and appearance seriously
as an axis of communication underscores the fundamental tension between
strict public school dress restrictions and core free speech principles. Mere
majoritarian preferences are a problematic justification for limiting students’
ability to convey their own message and an even more deeply problematic
justification for compelling students to wear clothing or styles that convey
state-sanctioned messages.305
299 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating
that American schools are integral to the functioning of democracy); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1
(“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence is essential to the preservation of the
rights and liberties of the people . . . .”).
300 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419–20 (1989) (flag burning); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75–76 (1976) (campaign spending); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376–77 (1968) (draft cards).
301 See supra Part IV.A.
302 See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 512–13; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
273 (1964) (stating that criticizing the government is “the central meaning of the First Amend-
ment”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373–79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating
that the purpose of the First Amendment was to allow for political, social, and cultural discus-
sion despite possibly disturbing the status quo).
303 See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 315 (1964).
304 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1203 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that pro-
tecting speech emphasizes the “instrumental values of expression” and is “intrinsically impor-
tant”); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422–29 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Edwin Baker, The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1978).
305 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006). Taking the communicative content of student dress and styling
choices seriously, as this Article advocates, would not only enable challenges to the policies on
grounds that they unconstitutionally limit students’ chosen speech, but also challenges arguing
that they compel student speech in violation of the First Amendment. Given the Supreme
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As other scholars have observed,306 the courts have not fully worked out
the implications of existing freedom of expression law for dress and styling
restrictions.307 As discussed above, lower courts have largely elided these
claims (except in the context of student desires to wear or refrain from wear-
ing particular words or slogans308) by dismissing the notion that students’
clothing choices are communicative or by classifying the communication at
issue as insufficiently “particularized” or unlikely to be understood by
others.309 However, this preemptive, ad hoc dismissal of the communicative
content of student dress choices is neither required by existing Supreme
Court precedent nor consistent with the realities of teen life and communica-
tion. Again, the conclusion is not that one could not write a reasoned, well-
cited legal opinion rejecting a free expression challenge to student dress re-
strictions, but instead that proper explication of underlying constitutional
values and doctrine and of the real world consequences of such restrictions
highlights the shallowness of the attempts thus far to do so.
3. Dress Codes and Gender Hierarchy
The vast majority of school dress codes regulate the appearance of fe-
male students much more than male students.310 There are more rules specifi-
Court’s recent fascination with such claims when they benefit conservative political aims, there
might be political, rhetorical, and legal value in emphasizing compelled speech arguments in
future challenges. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed. Of State, Cty., & Mun. Emp., 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2486 (2018) (overturning precedent and declaring that it violates compelled speech prin-
ciples to allow public unions to charge mandatory fees to non-members who they represent);
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018) (holding that
California laws requiring disclosures to pregnant women by anti-abortion counseling and
health care providers unconstitutionally compel speech); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (treating as serious constitutional issue argu-
ment that applying anti-discrimination laws to bakers who provide custom wedding cakes un-
constitutionally compels speech, though deciding case on other grounds).
306 See, e.g., Ramachandran, supra note 13. R
307 One of the persistent sources of confusion in this area of First Amendment law is the
conflation of two separate arguments that might be made to accord significant protection under
the Free Speech Clause. On the one hand, courts might recognize that dress and self-styling
convey particularized messaging that—while dense, nuanced, and imperfect—is sufficiently
communicative to count as the explicit articulation of ideas and values. Alternatively, courts
might conclude that dress and styling are not directly representational but, because of their
deep connection to other First Amendment values, ought to receive the same strong protection
courts have accorded non-representational art, nonsense poetry, and other similar categories of
speech. These latter categories of speech receive rich treatment in an important new book,
MARK TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN, & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE
SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017).
308 Compare Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 433 (9th Cir. 2008) (conclud-
ing that a content-neutral blanket ban on clothes with words was constitutional), with Frudden
v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down school uniform requirement
when students objected to specific message written on uniform).
309 See Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388 (6th Cir. 2005); Littlefield
v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 283 (5th Cir. 2001); Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1307 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974).
310 See supra Part II.D and supra notes 287–289 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-1\HLC108.txt unknown Seq: 56 13-MAR-19 10:36
104 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 54
cally directed towards young women; more rules that as a practical matter
apply only or mostly to women; and more effort exerted enforcing allegedly
gender neutral rules against women.311 These lopsided codes not only impose
more restraints on the ability of female students to express themselves and to
pursue their autonomous choices but also focus a disproportionate amount of
female students’ attention on policing their own appearance and sexuality.
This imposition of differential restraints and burdens on the basis of gender
is in deep tension with the commitment to gender equality the courts have
strongly, if imperfectly, pursued in their modern equal protection rulings.312
Indeed, many school dress codes are so poorly drafted and facially discrimi-
natory that they would fail to pass muster under a straightforward applica-
tion of existing precedent.313
As young feminist activists have convincingly argued, even school
dress codes that are superficially neutral run afoul of the Constitution’s com-
mitment to gender equality. They are grounded in patriarchal assumptions
about the dangers of the female body; the primacy of male claims to public
space and services; the responsibility of women to alter their self-presenta-
tion in ways that serve male interests in order to access those spaces and
services; and the state’s unwillingness to take responsibility for protecting
women from physical and sexual assault.314 When so unmasked, modern
dress codes defy—indeed mock—the state’s responsibility to provide “equal
protection of the laws.”315 As the Supreme Court demonstrated at many cru-
cial moments in modern history, the Equal Protection Clause is aggressively
pragmatic, with little patience for regulatory regimes that impose broad, dif-
ferential burdens on the civic participation of women, racial minorities, or
other marginalized groups or for the ad hoc justifications states use to ration-
alize such regimes.316
311 See St. George, supra note 288; D’Anastasio, supra note 289. R
312 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (restating that the standard is that the
gender classification (1) serve “important government objectives” and (2) must be “substan-
tially related to those important objectives” while applying standard somewhat laxly); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that government actions that facially
classify on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the government can provide an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for gender-specific action); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifications based on gender must serve “important govern-
ment objectives” and the government action must be “substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives”).
313 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (holding that rules that facially impose different rules on
men and women are constitutionally suspect and must be supported by an “exceedingly per-
suasive justification”).
314 See supra notes 287–289. R
315 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (striking down on first principles law
that made it impossible for gays and lesbians to seek protection from discrimination on the
local level because “it is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort”).
316 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (concluding that Virginia’s miscege-
nation law was “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy”); Virginia,
518 U.S. at 557 (“Virginia . . . has closed [VMI] to its daughters, and, instead, has devised for
them a ‘parallel program’ with faculty less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more
limited course offerings, fewer opportunities for military training and for scientific specializa-
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4. Excessive Enforcement Discretion
As discussed above, enforcement of dress codes in large public schools
presents immense and perhaps insurmountable difficulties.317 A small num-
ber of teachers and administrators with many other responsibilities are
tasked with applying rules that are usually complicated, often vague or am-
biguous, and at times require a measurement or a maneuver (for example,
“raise your arms”) upon a sea of constantly moving students with strong
incentives to avoid detection. Unpredictable and inequitable enforcement is
the inevitable result, with discipline often seeming arbitrary or vindictive.
These dynamics create conditions in tension with independent constitutional
norms that transcend more particularized concerns about the ability of
schools to impose strict dress restrictions. In a wide variety of contexts,
ranging from parade permitting318 to vehicular roadblocks,319 our constitu-
tional law precludes the use of rules or procedures that vest excessive discre-
tionary authority in enforcement officials or otherwise insufficiently protect
against arbitrary enforcement; this is true even in contexts where the state is
entitled to impose limits on expression or autonomy.320 Taking students seri-
ously as constitutional rights holders321 requires us not only to evaluate
whether the substance of student dress restrictions violates their rights but
also whether the implementation and enforcement of such a regime does so.
CONCLUSION
The episode chronicled in this Article reinforces some important les-
sons about how we make and understand constitutional law in the early
twenty-first century United States. First, and most importantly, constitutional
law is a slippery beast, difficult to capture, master, or anticipate even on
stable terrain. When old structures erode or new winds blow, those tasks
shade from challenge to folly. What looks like an emerging or even a stable
constitutional understanding at one moment might be passé within a genera-
tion.”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–94 (2013) (“The Act’s demonstrated
purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions
will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law.”); Romer, 517 U.S. at
634 (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”); Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a
central institution of the Nation’s society.”).
317 See supra notes 262–266, 270 and accompanying text. R
318 See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
319 See Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
320 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 147 (discussing time, place, and manner restriction
for use of public highways and sidewalks); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648 (discussing safety-related
regulatory stops of vehicles).
321 Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
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tion. It behooves us, therefore, to approach the tasks of constitutional prog-
nostication and advocacy with humility and caution.
On the other hand, the very fact that constitutional law is highly con-
testable creates opportunities and responsibilities. If, as this Article posits,
the raw materials of our constitutional tradition permit a variety of different
outcomes in most new and complicated arenas of constitutional dispute, and
if the outcomes we select are in the end the product of political and cultural
contestation, it becomes incumbent on people who care deeply about those
outcomes to engage in forceful organizing and advocacy for a constitutional
world that best reflects their values and their vision.
Our constitutional vision treats public schooling as a public responsibil-
ity that cannot be conditioned on arbitrary restrictions of student liberties.
We take seriously the idea that students are autonomous individuals who
maintain both an inherent human right to control their appearance absent a
compelling justification for limiting their autonomy, and a natural and im-
portant interest in using their dress and appearance to communicate crucial
information about their affinities, beliefs, and identities. We also remain pro-
foundly skeptical about the ability of a state organized, at least in part,
around complicated race, class, and gender assumptions, to articulate and
enforce evenhanded appearance and dress restrictions.
Our values and concerns once dominated the conversation about the
constitutional status of student dress restrictions. It is our hope that they will
one day do so again. In the meantime, it behooves us to understand how we
got where we are.
